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Article 4

HOSTILE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
ARI EZRA WALDMAN ∗
ABSTRACT
This Article is one in a series about bullying and cyberbullying in
schools. I argue that the proper analysis for a First Amendment
challenge to school discipline for off-campus misuse of the Internet to
harm or harass a member of the school community based on the victim’s identity depends on the nature of the offending behavior. For
students who are punished for a single incident—what I will call
cyberattacking—a student speech analysis that reflects the Court’s
consistent rationale in all its student speech cases, the “substantial
disruption” standard, makes sense. But students who engage in a
pattern of repeated incidents of cyberattacking—what I will call cyberbullying—create a hostile educational environment for their victims that parallels the behavior of harassers. Therefore, the relative
merit of cyberbullies’ First Amendment defenses to lawful punishment should depend more on the interaction between free speech
rights and harassment than on the interaction between free speech
and a single incident of aggression. And, while the Supreme Court
has never explicitly considered a First Amendment challenge to a harassment or stalking statute, it has stated that threats fall outside the
protections normally afforded to more valuable speech. In this context, just like the state has a compelling interest in protecting captive,
victimized minorities from hostile environments and abuse in certain
contexts, so too does the state have a compelling interest in protecting
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I. INTRODUCTION
Amelia and Zachary are unique. 1 They are the first in their
school to be suspended for bullying two classmates whom they have
never confronted in person. The offensive conduct that motivated
the suspension took place not in the cafeteria or during study hall or
in the locker room; rather, it took place online. Amelia and Zachary
are cyberaggressors. 2 Amelia created an “I Hate” video in which she
ridiculed a fellow student for her short hair, tendency to wear boys’
clothing, and perceived lesbianism, and then posted the video to a social networking website for her 500 friends to see. Zachary has been
bullying his victim for years, using a fake online profile to post homophobic slurs, spread rumors, and graphically depict his victim in
compromising sexual situations. Both victims reported the incidents
to their principal and both felt embarrassed, depressed, and increasingly unsafe in school as a result.
Our antagonists are part of an increasingly common breed of
bully that is confounding the judiciary and creating seemingly conflicting case law. 3 Cyberbullies eschew traditional face-to-face harassment in favor of the anesthetized distance and perceived anonymity
of the Internet. By taking their conduct off campus and making exclusive use of cyberspace, their behavior implicates student free
speech law in new and profound ways. But the ways in which the First
Amendment may interact or conflict with attempts to discipline cyberbullies vary. That is, while Amelia and Zachary are composites of
cyberaggressors recently in the news, they differ in one important respect: strictly speaking, only Zachary is a cyberbully.
There are two types of peer-to-peer cyberaggression cases, each
of which merit a different analysis to determine whether the First
Amendment bars punishment. Few cases are as neatly framed as the
hypotheticals involving Amelia, the single-incident cyberattacker, and
Zachary, the repeat offender; often, students combine single or repeated incidents of cyberaggression with face-to-face attacks. Amelia
1. Amelia and Zachary are hypothetical characters, but are also composites of aggressors in a variety of recent cyberbullying cases.
2. The terms “cyberaggressors,” “cyberbullying,” and “face-to-face bullying” are commonly used in the social science literature to distinguish between Internet-based harassment and traditional in-school bullying.
3. Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 572–73 (4th Cir. 2011)
(finding no First Amendment violation where school disciplined a student for the offcampus creation of a “hate website” that attacked a student), with Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a school could not punish a student for off-campus online speech merely because the speech was vulgar and reached inside the school).
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resembles both the alleged cyberbully in J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified
School District, 4 which involved a student who created a YouTube 5 video criticizing another student, and the roommate of Tyler Clementi, a
Rutgers University student who committed suicide after his roommate
surreptitiously streamed via Twitter 6 a video of Clementi with another
young man. 7
J.C. and Clementi’s cases, on the one hand, differ starkly from
stories like Kylie Kenney’s, 8 Phoebe Prince’s, 9 and Ryan Halligan’s, 10
on the other. The aggressors in the latter cases resemble our hypothetical Zachary, a tormenter who repeatedly used the Internet, social
networking websites, and other cybertechnologies to bully and harass
a victim over time. Neither scenario is necessarily more harmful or
tragic than the other; after all, both Clementi and Ryan Halligan
committed suicide. Nor are the two necessarily mutually exclusive—
the video in J.C. may have been the subject of a lawsuit, but could
have been part of a pattern of conduct. What distinguishes these two
categories of cases is the repetition of the offending behavior.
Despite the difference between a single incident and a pattern of
conduct, the few courts to address First Amendment defenses to a
school’s discipline of bullies and cyberbullies have approached both
cases through the lens of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District’s “substantial disruption” standard. 11 Tinker is the foundation of the Supreme Court’s student-speech jurisprudence, so it
would make sense for courts to default to that case for adjudicating
students’ free speech rights. Some courts have argued that because
4. 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
5. YouTube is a video-sharing website on which users can upload, share, and view videos. See www.youtube.com.
6. Twitter is a social networking and microblogging service that enables its users to
send and read short messages under 140 characters. A “tweet” can include a hyperlink to
another website, photograph, or, in this case, a video. See www.twitter.com.
7. See Richard Perez-Pena, Stricter Law on Bullying in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2011, at A18. Clementi’s roommate was convicted on 15 charges, including bias intimidation. See Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 2012, at A1.
8. Suzanne Struglinski, Schoolyard Bullying Has Gone High-Tech, DESERET MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/645194065/
Schoolyard-bullying-has-gone-high-tech.html.
9. Emily Bazelon, Bullies Beware: Massachusetts Just Passed the Country’s Best Anti-Bullying
Law, SLATE (Apr. 30, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2252543/.
10. RYAN’S STORY, www.ryanpatrickhalligan.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
11. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). Tinker concerned a student protest in which a group of
students wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War. Pursuant to a recently adopted
school policy against such protests, the students were suspended until they would return to
school without the armbands. Id. at 504.
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the Court has maintained the Tinker standard and carved out three
limited exceptions for three unique situations, 12 Tinker remains the
standard by which they should determine if the First Amendment bars
punishment of students like Amelia and Zachary. But, as currently
understood, the “substantial disruption” standard is, at best, unclear:
courts seem incapable of connecting a “substantial disruption” with
the potentially devastating effects on a student, group of students, and
school community when individuals are targeted for aggression based
on their identity.
What’s more, Zachary and Amelia are different kinds of aggressors. True bullying is characterized by repeated conduct, and when a
pattern of harassment is directed against a victim because of real or
perceived sexuality or nonconforming sexual behavior, that bullying
is strikingly similar to hostile environment harassment. It stands to
reason that the merit of a First Amendment defense to a school’s authority to punish Zachary, the cyberbully who engaged in a pattern of
harassing conduct over time, should fail just like a free speech challenge to a harassment or stalking statute will fail.
I argue that the proper analysis for a student’s First Amendment
challenge to school discipline for off-campus misuse of the Internet to
harm or attack another member of the school community depends on
the nature of the offending behavior. For students who are punished
for a single incident—what I will call cyberattacking—a student
speech analysis still makes sense. The kind of disruptions Tinker and
its progeny envisioned were never limited to a protest-related fracas,
but rather include the harm to the school’s ability to teach its students
successfully and the impairment of rights caused by cyberharassment:
it harms the victim’s ability to access his equal right to an education,
destroys the victim’s community, and disrupts the entire school. This
proposal should capture the most devastating cyberattackers, but immunize some single-incident attackers whose conduct is too similar to
the common, albeit immature, give-and-take among adolescents.
For students who engage in a pattern of repeated incidents of cyberattacking—what I will call cyberbullying—their creation of a hostile educational environment for their victims parallels the behavior

12. Over time, the Court has carved out three exceptions to Tinker’s protection of student speech. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court held that schools may prohibit “offensively lewd and indecent speech.” 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). In Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court held that schools may regulate a student-produced
newsletter where it bears the imprimatur of the school. 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988). And in
Morse v. Frederick, the Court allowed schools to prohibit speech that encourages illegal drug
use. 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
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of common harassers. Therefore, a cyberbully’s First Amendment defense to school punishment should depend more on the interaction
between free-speech rights and harassment than on the interaction
between free speech and a single incident of aggression. In this context, the state has a compelling interest to protect victims bullied in
schools for their sexual identity. For these egregious cases, a First
Amendment defense to discipline should fail.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II will argue that cyberbullying (and face-to-face bullying, for that matter) merits different
treatment than single-incident cyberattacking. Social scientists unanimously agree that bullying depends on repeated conduct and have
shown that bullying and cyberbullying can have more lasting and
more serious short- and long-term effects than a single incident of cyberattacking. Part III will lay out the First Amendment defense to
school discipline for cyberbullying, suggesting that the argument has
some intuitive appeal and warrants a rigorous response if punishments for off-campus cyberbullying are to become readily available to
educators. Part IV will address the difference between cyberattackers
and cyberbullies, arguing that they deserve different First Amendment analyses and suggesting that a cyberbully is less likely to find solace behind free speech rights than a cyberaggressor. Part V will conclude with policy arguments justifying this new framework.
II. PROPERLY DEFINING THE PROBLEM OF CYBERBULLYING
The evolution of bullying from the playground to cyberspace
represents an insidious and growing problem for schools and adolescents. Cyberattacking and cyberbullying defy the ordinary rules of
face-to-face aggression and are generally free of supervision, a natural
palliative or ameliorative force in the schoolyard. 13 It should come as
no surprise then, that cyberattacking and cyberbullying can lead to
poor academic performance, social maladjustment, and absenteeism,
and can cause more lasting and severe effects, including depression,
anxiety, and suicidal ideation. 14 Such effects, alongside a spate of recent bullying and cyberbullying tragedies, are reason enough to con-

13. M. Martinez-Dick & S. Landau, Cyberbullying: Individual Differences as Predictors
of Children’s Harassment of Others 2 (2008), presented at the National Association of
School Psychologists Annual Convention, New Oreleans, LA, available at
http://psychology.illinoisstate.edu/selandau/Cyber%20NASP%202008.pdf.
14. See Nancy Willard, Educator’s Guide to Cyberbullying and Cyberthreats, CYBERBULLY.ORG
5 (Apr. 2007), http://www.cyberbully.org/cyberbully/docs/cbcteducator.pdf (explaining
that the harm—including low self-esteem, depression, school failure, and suicide—caused
by cyberbullying may be even greater than harm caused by traditional bullying).
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sider a legal response. But while the legal academy is addressing the
merits of those judicial and legislative responses,15 the current literature suffers from a lack of specificity as to what the problem actually is
and where to direct those responses. As I have described, there is a
difference between single-incident cyberattacking and cyberbullying,
both in their frequency and effects. It makes sense, therefore, to distinguish single-incident cyberattacking from true cyberbullying for
two reasons. First, the distinction is faithful to the social science literature that unanimously requires repeated conduct in any bullying
definition. Second, some single-incident cyberattacking occurs so
frequently that its inclusion under the cyberbullying umbrella would
deflect attention, overwhelm any response, and give fodder to opponents of bullying regulation as over-inclusive and futile.
A. Definitions and Distinguishing Characteristics of Cyberattacking and
Cyberbullying
Cyberattacking and cyberbullying merit different legal analyses in
part because psychologists, educators, and other social scientists distinguish between the two in their scholarship. The Journal of the American Medical Association defines bullying as “a specific type of aggression in which (1) the behavior is intended to harm or disturb, (2) the
behavior occurs repeatedly over time, and (3) there is an imbalance
of power, with a more powerful person or group attacking a less powerful one.” 16 The asymmetry of power could be physical (that is, an
athletic student versus a less-physically developed victim) or psychological (that is, high self-esteem versus low self-esteem). The bullying
can occur verbally (name-calling, threats, taunts, malicious teasing),
physically (hitting, kicking, taking personal belongings), or psychologically (spreading rumors, social exclusion). 17 The Department of
Justice adds that “bullying . . . involves a real or perceived imbalance
of power, with the more powerful child or group attacking those who
are less powerful.” 18 Physical injury from assaults and emotional in15. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 89 (2009) (arguing that courts should combat cyberbullying with existing civil rights laws); Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the Online Playground Safe for
Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 874 (2010) (arguing for an “innovative,
multidisciplinary approach” to tackle cyberbullying); Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: AntiGay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
16. Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among U.S. Youth: Prevalence and Association
with Psychological Adjustment, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2094, 2094 (2001).
17. Id.
18. Warren J. Blumenfeld & R.M. Cooper, LGBT and Allied Youth Responses to Cyberbullying: Policy Implications, 3 INT’L J. CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 114, 115 (2010) (quoting NELS
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jury from direct insults and epithets may be the paradigmatic types of
harm, but aggression is not limited to those injuries. Psychological
harm caused by repeated exclusion, for example, also fits under the
bullying umbrella. 19 This is called indirect bullying. 20 What social
scientists call cyberbullying is, like traditional or face-to-face bullying,
the deliberate and repeated hostile behavior by a strong individual or
group intended to harm a weaker individual or group. 21 The distinction is in the media of harm, such as websites, email, chat rooms, mobile phones, text messaging, and instant messaging. 22
These broad definitions—generally accepted in some form or
another in the social science literature 23 and in most states’ antibullying statutes 24—are notable for three reasons. 25 First, for behavior

ERICSON, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FACT SHEET NO. 27, ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF JUVENILE BULLYING 1 (2001), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200127.pdf).
19. Id. at 119. Perhaps the “Ugly Meter” iPhone application, which uses facial recognition software to tell someone how ugly he or she is, can be fodder for such bullying. See
Rosemary Black & Lindsay Goldwert, ‘Ugly Meter’ iPhone App May Be Hurtful to Kids and Fodder for Bullies, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 20, 2010, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/
life-style/ugly-meter-iphone-app-hurtful-kids-fodder-bullies-article-1.190668.
20. Dan Olweus, Annotation: Bullying at School: Basic Facts and Effects of a School Based Intervention Program, 35 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 1171, 1173 (1994).
21. See Blumenfeld & Cooper, supra note 18, at 118 (defining cyberbullying).
22. Id. at 119. Blumenfeld and Cooper provide the following paradigmatic examples:
(1) sending “Flame Mail” to a group to humiliate a victim (“She’s so ugly, so I sent out a
flame mail to the entire school making fun of her acne”); (2) electronic hate mail; (3) taking a victim’s screen name and sending an embarrassing message under that name; (4)
anonymous derogatory posts on blogs or social networking sites; (5) online polling pages
to rate victims as “ugliest,” “biggest dyke,” or “most fem faggot”; (6) taking pictures of a
victim in a state of undress and posting the picture to a social networking site; (7) creating
websites to ridicule and mock others; (8) posting private material about a victim to a social
networking site; (9) directly sending intimidating or threatening text messages or emails
(“cyberstalking”); or (10) excluding victims from online communication with the group.
Id.
23. A number of studies have suggested additions or subtractions to the definition.
For example, Smith and Sharp have suggested that bullying must be unprovoked by the
victim. See Oyaziwo Aluede et al., A Review of the Extent, Nature, Characteristics and Effects of
Bullying Behaviour in Schools, 35 J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 151, 152 (2008) (citing
SCHOOL BULLYING: INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES 9 (Peter K. Smith & Sonia Sharp eds.,
1994)).
24. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37O (2010) (defining bullying as “the repeated
use by one or more students of a written, verbal or electronic expression or a physical act
or gesture or any combination thereof, directed at a victim that: (i) causes physical or
emotional harm to the victim or damage to the victim's property; (ii) places the victim in
reasonable fear of harm to himself or of damage to his property; (iii) creates a hostile environment at school for the victim; (iv) infringes on the rights of the victim at school; or
(v) materially and substantially disrupts the education process or the orderly operation of
a school”).
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to reach the level of bullying, it must be repeated. This definition excludes single incidents. Requiring repeated behavior for bullying and
cyberbullying makes sense for a variety of reasons. When students are
asked survey questions about “bullying” or “cyberbullying,” their responses almost unanimously assume repeated conduct. 26 Further, if
Nancy Willard, executive director of the Center for Safe and Responsible Internet Use, is correct that cyberbullying is general “cruel[ty] to
others by sending or posting harmful material or engaging in other
forms of social aggression using the Internet or other digital technologies,” 27 then it is difficult to imagine who among us is not a bully or
cyberbully.
Capturing too much conduct under the bullying and cyberbullying umbrellas does a disservice to the victims of real bullying. Victims
subjected to repeated physical, verbal, and psychological bullying, like
Jamie Nabozny, for example, are qualitatively different than victims in
cases like J.C., who face single-incident attacks. 28 Jamie, in contrast,
was verbally, emotionally, and physically harassed for four years until
he needed hospital stays to recover, attempted suicide, and switched
schools. 29 He was hit, spit on, victimized during a mock rape, attacked from behind and urinated upon in a restroom, kicked by bullies in the hallways, and constantly berated with homophobic epiConversely, the victim in J.C. reported that she was
thets. 30
25. Much of this discussion is taken from a forthcoming piece arguing that criminalization of bullying and cyberbullying is unlikely to solve the bullying problem in schools. See
Waldman, supra note 15.
26. The breadth of cyberbullying research in this area is too vast to recite. See, e.g.,
Blumenfeld & Cooper, supra note 18, at 128; SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN,
BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD: PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING
17–104 (2009); Waldman, supra note 15 (reporting the results of the first stage of the author’s own empirical research on bullying and cyberbullying in one San Diego high
school).
27. Willard, supra note 14, at 1.
28. See J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (involving a student who posted a YouTube video that criticized another student).
29. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451–52 (7th Cir. 1996).
30. Id. In tenth grade, while studying in the library before school began, Jamie was
attacked by a group of students. Id. at 452. One student kicked Jamie in the stomach for
five or ten minutes while the others looked on laughing. Id. Weeks later, Jamie collapsed
from internal bleeding as a result of the beating. Id. By the next year, Jamie left Ashland
High School, enrolled in a school in Minneapolis and was ultimately diagnosed with PostTraumatic Stress Disorder resulting from years of being bullied. Id. Perhaps the most
tragic feature of Jamie’s story is the inexplicable refusal of any school official to do anything about the harassment and their flagrant endorsement of the behavior. See id. (after
reporting the attack by the eight boys, the official in charge of discipline “laughed and told
[Jamie] that [Jamie] deserved such treatment because he is gay”). Jamie’s case suggests
that holding school officials responsible for failure to stop bullying under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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considering not going to school the day after an insulting video appeared on YouTube. 31
Second, the asymmetrical status of the victim and the aggressor is
essential to categorizing the conduct as bullying. At least two studies
have suggested that the difference between aggression and the normal give-and-take of the schoolyard is the relationship between the
parties—two high-status students tease each other, while a high-status
student bullies a low-status student. 32 Low status can be based on any
number of asymmetries, with physical strength representing only the
most noticeable paradigm. Minority status, for example, causes a significant asymmetry in power, especially where the particular minority
is the subject of ridicule, bigotry, and hatred outside the school. 33 It
should come as no surprise, then, that young members of the gay and
lesbian community are uniquely susceptible to bullying and its tragic
consequences. They are bullied because they deviate from the
norm; 34 because their possible noncomformity to heterosexual social
norms makes them different or set apart and, thus, easy targets; and
because anti-gay bullying is either tacitly or explicitly condoned by anti-gay bigotry in society at large. 35
The third notable characteristic of the definition of bullying is
that other than repetition, the other elements of the bullying definition—intent to harm and imbalance of power—are common to cyberbullies and cyberattackers. Although cyberattacking and cyberbullying can cause the same kind of effects, the repeated nature of
is one possible legal recourse. See id. at 453 (bringing a § 1983 claim against school administrators for failure to stop bullying). That tactic is of limited use in many other bullying
cases. Waldman, supra note 15.
31. J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (“[The victim] never testified that she feared any type
of physical attack as a result of the video. Instead, [she] felt embarrassed, her feelings
were hurt, and she temporarily did not want to go to class.”).
32. See Ken Rigby & P.T. Slee, Children’s Attitudes Toward Victims, in UNDERSTANDING
AND MANAGING BULLYING 119–35 (D.P. Tattum ed., 1993); Marilyn Langevin, Teasing and
Bullying: Helping Children Deal with Teasing and Bullying: For Parents, Teachers, and Other
Adults, INST. FOR STUTTERING TREATMENT & RESEARCH, http://www.stutterisa.org/
CDRomProject/teasing/tease_bully.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (stating that a key
element of bullying is a power imbalance).
33. For a good discussion of the unique effects of cyberharassment and cyberhate on
minorities and women, see Citron, supra note 15, at 68–84.
34. See, e.g., Anthony R. D’Augelli et al., Childhood Gender Atypicality, Victimization, and
PTSD Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, 21 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 1462, 1477–
80 (2006).
35. See Waldman, supra note 15 (discussing the reasons why LGBT youth and those
perceived to be gay are more susceptible to bullying and cyberbullying in schools); see also
MARY ANNE GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 101–
05 (1991) (noting that silence from authority can teach society that bad behavior is acceptable).
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bullying tends to amplify their gravity. A single incident of aggression
can cause significant harm, 36 but, generally, victims of repeated bullying tend to experience more serious negative outcomes, from withdrawal from school activities 37 and increased Internet use to the exclusion of face-to-face interaction with others 38 and depression. 39
Victims of cyberbullying more often report feelings of suicidal ideation, suicide attempts, severe depression, anxiety that impacts daily
activities, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).
B. Frequency of Cyberattacking Versus Cyberbullying
Another reason why cyberattacking and cyberbullying should receive different legal treatment is that some single-incident cyberattacks are too common to merit a departure from free speech values.
When assessing the frequency and effects of cyberbullying on their
test subjects, social scientists distinguish between single incidents and
repeated patterns. 40 Their data show that supermajorities of certain
student populations have experienced single-incident cyberattacking,
but significantly fewer report the kind of negative effects that activists
and legislators have said merit a strong state or legal response. 41 This
suggests that if single-incident cyberattacking were crowded under the
cyberbullying umbrella, there would be little conduct left outside the
reach of anti-cyberbullying regulations.
High levels of Internet use among young people 42 make cyberattacking all too common. According to a 2004 study conducted by iSAFE America, an Internet safety education foundation, 58 percent of
36. See, e.g., Adrienne Nishina & Jaana Juvonen, Daily Reports of Witnessing and Experiencing Peer Harassment in Middle School, 76 CHILD DEV. 435, 440–42, 446 (2005); Michele L.
Ybarra et al., Examining Characteristics and Associated Distress Related to Internet Harassment:
Findings From the Second Youth Internet Safety Survey, 118 PEDIATRICS 1169, 1173–75 (2006).
37. NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS: RESPONDING TO THE
CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL CRUELTY, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 27–56 (2006).
38. Id.
39. Susan M. Swearer et al., “You’re So Gay!”: Do Different Forms of Bullying Matter for Adolescent Males?, 37 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 160, 170 (2008) (finding that adolescent gay males
who frequently experience repeated bullying have increased rates of depression).
40. See Cyber Bullying: Statistics and Tips, I-SAFE AMERICA (June 28, 2004),
http://www.isafe.org/channels/sub.php?ch=op&sub_id=media_cyber_bullying [hereinafter i-SAFE Survey] (differentiating between respondents who reported one incident of cyberattacking and those who reported repeated attacks).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 43–48.
42. A study conducted by UCLA found that in 2001 approximately 91 percent of
twelve- to fifteen-year-olds and almost all sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds—99 percent—use
the Internet on a regular basis. Harlan Lebo, The UCLA Internet Report: Surveying the Digital
Future: Year 3, 21 (2003), available at http://images.forbes.com/fdc/mediaresourcecenter
/UCLA03.pdf.
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students reported receiving hurtful or angry messages online, with
more than 40 percent saying it has happened “more than once.” 43
Twenty-one percent of respondents received “mean” or “threatening”
emails, while 53 percent admitted to sending hurtful messages over
the Internet to someone else. Of the latter group, more than one in
three admitted to doing so “more than once.” Thirty-five percent had
been threatened online, with nearly one in five saying it happened
“more than once.” Finally, 42 percent reported being attacked online
once, with one in four experiencing it “more than once.” 44 In 2006,
another survey found 9 percent of students reported being regularly
harassed online. 45 When students in another study were asked if they
experienced cyberharassment at least once over a two-month period,
25 percent of girls and 11 percent of boys responded affirmatively. 46
In 2008, a study conducted by UCLA found that nearly one-fifth of
respondents (19 percent) experienced frequent online bullying in
the past year, but more than three times as many experienced one incident of online aggression. 47 If state legislatures and schools applied
their cyberbullying rules to all these students who experienced at least
one incident of aggressive behavior online, resources would be
stretched and cyberbullying would become the norm. 48
An analysis of bullying and cyberbullying surveys of the lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) community highlights the
distinction between single-incident aggression and bullying even further. 49 Of those who participated in the Gay, Lesbian and Straight

43. I-SAFE Survey, supra note 40.
44. Id.
45. JANIS WOLAK ET AL., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 10
(2006), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf.
46. Andrew V. Beale & Kimberly R. Hall, Cyberbullying: What School Administrators (and
Parents) Can Do, 81 THE CLEARING HOUSE 8, 8 (2007) (citing R.M. Kowalski & S. Limber,
Cyberbullying Among Middle School Children (2005) (unpublished manuscript)).
47. Jaana Juvonen & Elisheva F. Gross, Extending the School Grounds?—Bullying Experiences in Cyberspace, 78 J. SCH. HEALTH 496, 500 (2008). Those who use instant messaging,
webcams, and video chat technologies, such as AIM, iChat, and Skype, were about 1.5 to
2.8 times as likely to be cyberbullied than those who did not use such communication
tools. Id. at 501. Nearly 94 percent of adolescents, however, use those virtual communication technologies. Id. at 500.
48. See infra note 60.
49. Like face-to-face bullying, cyberbullying is not limited to minorities. However, gay
and lesbian students, as well as those questioning their sexual orientation, are overrepresented in student populations that experience both single-incident and frequent online
harassment from fellow students. See Waldman, supra note 15 (discussing the reasons why
LGBT youth and those perceived to be gay are more susceptible to bullying and cyberbullying in schools). As a result of the LGBT community’s unique victimization in this area,
studies focusing on this student population are particularly thorough and detailed.
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Education Network’s (“GLSEN”) 2009 National School Climate Survey, 50 88.9 percent reported hearing the word “gay” used in a negative
way frequently or often, 72.4 percent reported hearing other homophobic remarks (such as “dyke” or “faggot”) in school and online frequently or often, and 84.6 percent said they were verbally harassed at
least once (for example, called names or threatened with violence)
because of their sexual orientation. 51 More than 40 percent were
physically harassed (that is, pushed, shoved or otherwise physically attacked) at least once at school in the past year because of their sexual
orientation, and nearly 53 percent were harassed or threatened via
electronic media (for example, text messages, emails, instant messages or postings on Facebook) at least once. 52 Based on this research,
and accounting for the increased victimization of LGBT students—
while the latest research suggests that 19 percent of all students experience repeated incidents of cyberbullying, 53 31 percent of gay and
lesbian students are victims of frequent online harassment—the
number of LGBT students who experience single-incident cyberattacking is exponentially higher than those who are cyberbullied. 54
By broadening the term “bullying” to include all single incidents
of aggression, we radically change the nature of the problem. Using
the data from the i-Safe Survey, there is a two-fold difference between
victims of cyberbullying—just over one in four students—and victims
of cyberattacking—over four in ten students. 55 Even that pales in
comparison to the nearly nine in ten LGBT students who report experiencing single incidents of aggression. 56 Including cyberattacking
under the bullying umbrella minimizes the problems faced by those
adolescents who cannot go online without being victimized. Overex-

50. While most of this evidence refers to face-to-face or in-school bullying, it helps establish the difference between single-incident aggression and bullying, in general.
51. Joseph G. Kosciw et al., Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network, The 2009 National School Climate Survey: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our
Nation’s Schools 16, 26 (2010) [hereinafter GLSEN Survey], available at
http://glsen.org/binary-data/GLSEN_ATTACHMENTS/file/000/001/1675-2.pdf .
52. Id. at 26, 28. Other rigorous studies confirm GLSEN’s findings. In a survey of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual students in New York schools, nearly 70 percent reported being harassed because of their sexual orientation or gender identity at least once. Advocates for
Children of N.Y., In Harm’s Way: A Survey of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Students
Who Speak About Harassment and Discrimination in New York City Schools 4 (2005), available at
http://www.advocatesforchildren.org/pubs/lgbt_report.pdf.
53. See Juvonen & Gross, supra note 47, at 500.
54. GLSEN Survey, supra note 51, at 28 (finding that 52.9 percent of LGBT students
experienced isolated cyberattacks while 31 percent experienced frequent cyberattacks).
55. I-SAFE Survey, supra note 40.
56. GLSEN Survey, supra note 51, at 16.
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tending bullying equates the aggressor in J.C.—who posted a single
video criticizing another student 57—with the aggressor in Nabozny,
who tortured Jamie for being gay for four years until Jamie attempted
suicide, switched schools, and developed PTSD. 58
In addition, grouping all kinds of aggression together makes the
problem universal, which has two consequences. As a practical matter, it allows opponents with ulterior motives to criticize all bullying
responses. Focus on the Family and other anti-gay conservative
groups, for example, oppose both state-sponsored and schooldirected anti-bullying programs because they believe the programs
could lead to acceptance and tolerance of gays. 59 By focusing instead
on the worst cases—repeated harassment and identity-based attacks—
anti-bullying advocates can effectively silence this irrationality. 60
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, CYBERATTACKING, AND CYBERBULLYING
Fidelity to the social science literature, 61 as well as strategic and
practical concerns about describing too much common conduct as
cyberbullying, suggests that judges should treat cyberattacking and
cyberbullying cases differently. Normally, cases would progress as follows: Amelia creates her video that ridicules a classmate for failing to
conform to sexual norms. Zachary uses his website and a fake social
networking profile to harass his victim over a period of time. Both
57. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
58. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451–52 (7th Cir. 1996).
59. Eric Lach, Focus on the Family: Anti-Bullying Efforts Are a Gay Front, TPM (Aug. 31,
2010, 9:59 AM), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/08/focus_on_
the_family_dont_let_gay_activists_hijack.php; Robert Casey, Focus on the Family Stands Up
for Bullying, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2010, 5:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
bob-casey/focus-on-the-family-stand_b_709651.html (discussing conservative opposition to
legislation directed at addressing the problem of bullying in schools).
60. More significantly, regulating and policing conduct in which supermajorities of
students engage creates a new norm instead of highlighting and condemning bad behavior. It would turn bullying into the jaywalking of school misbehavior. Jaywalking is illegal
in Manhattan, see N.Y.C., N.Y. RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 34, § 4-04(b)(2), (c) (2011),
but on any given day, almost everyone working in Manhattan violates that rule and no one
ever gets a ticket. Occasionally, pedestrians do get tickets, but it is hardly the norm. Rabbi
Angry at NYPD over Jaywalking Ticket, CBS NEWS (Nov. 29, 2010, 10:30 PM),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/11/29/rabbi-angry-at-nypd-over-jaywalking-ticket/.
To paraphrase W.S. Gilbert, when everyone is a bully, then no one is. W.S. Gilbert & Arthur Sullivan, The Gondoliers act. II, in THE COMPLETE AND ANNOTATED GILBERT AND
SULLIVAN 937 (Ian Bradley ed., 1996).
61. Some scholars argue that the psychological definition of bullying may not be appropriate as a legal definition. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Coming to Terms with Cyberbullying, 77 MO.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Lyrissa Lidsky, Criminalizing Cyberbullying and the Problem of CyberOverbreadth, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:37 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2012/02/cyberbullying-cyberlegislation-and-cyberoverbreadth.html.
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victims inform their principal and report significant negative effects
of the aggression. After the principal suspends Amelia and Zachary
for two weeks, they sue 62 school officials 63 for violation of their First
Amendment rights in connection with the suspension.
I argue that Amelia’s First Amendment defense should be judged
under the Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence. Conversely, Zachary’s First Amendment claim should be analyzed like a harasser’s free speech challenge. After all, Zachary is creating a hostile environment for his victim by ridiculing him on the bases of sex and
sexual nonconformity. While there is far less precedent in this area,
Zachary’s free speech claim should fail because his threatening conduct created a hostile educational environment for a captive audience. 64
Before addressing the merits of either Amelia’s or Zachary’s free
speech defenses, we must dispose of the plaintiffs’ likely threshold argument that school discipline is always inappropriate for conduct that
takes place off-campus. Schools that punish off-campus cyberattackers and cyberbullies, the argument goes, violate the students’ free
speech rights in two related ways: First, a school’s authority to discipline its students ends at the schoolhouse gate,65 which takes the allegedly offending behavior outside the ambit of student speech jurisprudence.
Second, the argument continues, cyberaggressive
behavior should not be judged under Tinker and its progeny, but rather on the speech/action fulcrum that governs nonstudent speech.
This argument aims to cut off school disciplinary authority at the
threshold: if a campus presence is required, a school cannot punish

62. Most likely, Amelia and Zachary would sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principal
mechanism for seeking redress for an alleged deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights by state actors. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 978–79 (6th Cir.
1984). Raising a § 1983 claim has its own difficulties, full discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this paper. See Waldman, supra note 15. For background on litigation under
§ 1983, see generally M. DAVID GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ch. 6 (1984).
63. Section 1983 plaintiffs can also sue school districts in addition to school officials.
This element of the hypothetical case is irrelevant for this Article’s First Amendment thesis.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 325–341.
65. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Censorship of Student Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing
Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L.
199, 221 (rejecting one commentator’s analysis because it “would allow school officials to
punish students for off-campus conduct—an area beyond their jurisdiction”); Clay Calvert,
Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 276 (2001) (describing a view that outside the classroom,
children should be classified as citizens rather than students).
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an off-campus cyberaggressor or cyberbully regardless of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard.
This view seems reasonable at first. In Tinker, the Court arguably
used the on-campus/off-campus distinction as the basis for its finding
that students enjoy fewer free-speech rights than members of society
at large. 66 And, in upholding school regulation of certain student
speech in a subsequent case, the Court expressly advised that “[a]
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its
basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor
similar speech outside the school.” 67 Various circuits have taken the geographic distinction to heart, finding student-written parodies created
and distributed off campus 68 and unofficial school newspapers distributed off campus before and after school hours 69 beyond the reach of
school discipline, 70 but finding them subject to school discipline
where distribution took place on campus. 71 The only exception to the
rule is when the offending speech is offered at an off-campus event
sponsored and supervised by the school. 72 In these cases, the school’s
aegis over the event creates a constructive schoolyard that extends the
school’s disciplinary authority.
Though attractive, the campus presence argument should not
serve as an a priori barrier to school discipline of cyberattacking or cyberbullying for three reasons. First, a close reading of Tinker and its
progeny suggests that the Supreme Court never intended to create a
bright line between on-campus and off-campus speech. 73 Second,
even if it did, the Internet’s ability to affect our physical spaces and its
transcendent role in modern society and education makes that rule

66. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”) (emphasis added).
67. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (emphasis added)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979).
69. Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964 (5th Cir. 1972).
70. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004) (declining to find that student drawing done off campus could be regulated by school); Killion v.
Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“Although there is
limited case law on the issue, courts considering speech that occurs off school grounds
have concluded (relying on Supreme Court decisions) that school officials’ authority over
off-campus expression is much more limited than expression on school grounds.”); Klein
v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441–42 (D. Me. 1986) (enjoining suspension of a student
who made a vulgar gesture to a teacher while off campus).
71. Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch. Ind. Sch. Dist., 822 F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1987).
72. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393, 400–01 (2007).
73. See infra Part III.A.
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meaningless today. 74 Third, even if a campus presence mattered, the
suggestion that cyberattacking and cyberbullying are “mere speech”
rather than action, thus deserving First Amendment protection, fails
as a matter of theory and practice. 75
A. Campus Presence Requirement
1. The Supreme Court Has Never Required a Campus Presence for
School Disciplinary Authority
In its student speech cases, the Supreme Court has created one
governing standard (Tinker) and carved out three limited exceptions,
none of which requires a campus presence for school disciplinary authority. 76 In Tinker, the Court held that a school may regulate a student’s expressive conduct if such expression causes or is reasonably
likely to cause a material and substantial disruption to school activities. 77 That case famously involved three students who were suspended for wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War in violation of school rules. After the students challenged
their suspension, the Court concluded that the school’s disciplinary
action violated the students’ First Amendment rights because the protest was “a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by
any disorder or disturbance.” 78 Conversely, school discipline would
only be appropriate where the facts “reasonably [lead] school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities” as a result of the student speech at issue. 79 Nothing
in that standard requires a campus presence to create a reasonable
fear of disruption.
The Court decided three student speech cases after Tinker and,
while it has yet to consider a case involving a First Amendment defense to school punishment for cyberattacking or cyberbullying, the
exceptions to Tinker all retained Tinker’s rejection of the campus
presence requirement. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the
Court carved out an exception to Tinker’s “material and substantial”
disruption standard for lewd and “patently offensive” speech at a

74. See infra Part III.B.
75. See infra Part III.B.
76. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273
(1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
77. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
78. Id. at 508.
79. Id. at 514.
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school event. 80 Such speech could be regulated by a school even absent any disruption. 81 Fraser was a high school student who gave a
speech nominating a fellow student for elective office during a school
assembly. The speech was an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor” about the candidate’s sexual prowess, filled with double
entendres about male sexuality. 82 The Court upheld Fraser’s suspension because a school has an obligation to teach the values, civility,
and behavior that are “socially appropriate” and “essential to a democratic society.” 83 So, while Fraser could have given his speech free of
government interference outside the context of the “school environment,” 84 the Court held that where a student engages in lewd, vulgar,
or offensive speech, the school may regulate such speech as part of its
duty to teach “essential lessons of civil, mature conduct,” even absent
evidence of substantial disruption to the school. 85
As in Tinker, nothing in this standard requires the speech to have
taken place on campus. Admittedly, Fraser gave his speech at a
school assembly, on school grounds and during school hours; but the
location and time of his speech were not essential to the Court’s justification for its holding. The school’s disciplinary authority emanated
from the school’s educational mission to teach its students “the
shared values of a civilized social order,” not simply because the
speech or event happened on campus. 86 This suggests that the school
could have disciplined Fraser even if the assembly took place in the
Washington State Capitol’s legislative chamber on a class trip because
Fraser recognized that the school’s educational mission extended
beyond the boundaries of the campus.
The second exception to Tinker’s “material and substantial” disruption standard applies to school-sponsored speech, or speech that
bears the official imprimatur of the school, and allows student officials great leeway in banning inappropriate student speech. In Hazel80. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684–85.
81. Id. at 683. Significantly, the Court noted that the record contained ample evidence
of disruption. Teachers testified at trial that some students reacted by laughing, others
were shocked, and the youngest students were confused and awkward. Id. at 683–84.
These reactions, however, were not essential to the Court’s holding that the school could
lawfully discipline Fraser. Id. at 685.
82. Id. at 678. The sexual nature of the speech made Chief Justice Burger so uncomfortable that he wrote his entire majority opinion without ever quoting the speech. Justice
Brennan filled that void at the beginning of his concurrence by quoting the entire speech.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 681 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 683 (majority opinion).
86. Id.

2012]

HOSTILE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

723

wood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court upheld a principal’s decision to remove two articles on teen pregnancy and divorce from the
school’s newspaper. 87 Distinguishing Tinker, the Court said that the
two cases posed two different issues: Tinker concerned whether a
school must tolerate student speech it does not like, but Kuhlmeier addressed whether the school must affirmatively promote student
speech it believes does not comport with its educational mission. 88 After all, the newspaper was part of a journalism class and bore the emblem of the school. 89 As such, the Court held that “[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over” speech that could reasonably
be interpreted as endorsed by the school. 90
The Kuhlmeier exception for school-sponsored speech has no
more of a campus presence requirement than Tinker or Fraser. Even if
the students did their work at home and after school, as long as they
published their work in a school-sponsored newspaper, school officials could exercise significant editorial control. 91
Finally, the Court’s third exception to Tinker’s analysis captures
student speech that “is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug
use.” 92 In Morse v. Frederick, a student attending the Olympic Torch
Relay that passed on the street in front of his high school held a sign
that the principal believed promoted the use of marijuana. 93 The
Court upheld the school’s suspension of that student because the student was present at a school-sponsored viewing of the Relay, unfurled
his banner so everyone at the school could see, and arguably promoted conduct that the school had an interest in stopping. 94 The
Court based its holding not on where Frederick stood when he expressed his opinions (which was off campus), but on the school’s
educational mission and its legitimate goal of not only stopping illegal
drug use, but also to prevent anyone from using school time to promote it. 95 Like Tinker and the exceptions created in Fraser and Kuhlmeier, a campus presence is not required in Morse. What is required is
a student acting in a context in which he is acting qua student, that is,
at an assembly, in a journalism class, or at a school-sponsored event.
87. 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988).
88. Id. at 270–71.
89. Id. at 268.
90. Id. at 271.
91. Id. (stating that educators have authority over school-sponsored publications
“whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting”).
92. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007).
93. Id. at 397–98. The sign read, “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” Id. at 397.
94. Id. at 397, 408.
95. Id. at 409–10.
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2. What Matters Is a Student Acting qua Student
Although these cases are littered with references to the schoolhouse, the classroom, and other physical nexuses to the school, that is
of no moment. The evidence of a campus presence is arguably a simple heuristic for determining when the behavior at issue characterizes
the student qua student, rather than student qua citizen, qua Little
Leaguer, or any other persona not related to the school. While most
student speech analyses begin with Tinker’s oft-quoted premise that
the “schoolhouse gate” does not extinguish student free speech
rights, a close reading of these cases suggests that the Supreme Court
is not speaking literally. There is no physical gate delineating the
boundaries of student speech; rather, it is shorthand for when a given
adolescent is subject to school discipline and when he is not. The
evidence for this conclusion is twofold. First, both the Court’s language and substance suggests that its student speech cases were more
about the relationship between the student and his education than
about the geographic boundaries of a school campus. Second, wherever it appears to rest its conclusions on location or school property,
the Court follows with a reminder that the physical campus is just a
symbol of or stands in for the educational mission.
Students are “‘persons’ under our Constitution” in and out of
school, 96 but it is not the boundary of the school campus that distinguishes the extent of their rights. It is the “school environment”97
that plays that role. Here, a school is defined by its mission—to teach
and educate minors in the ways of civil society. 98 That mission may
extend beyond the classroom, as the Court held in Morse. 99 The Court
upheld the school’s disciplinary authority because school officials
must be empowered “to safeguard those entrusted to their care,” regardless of on which side of the campus boundary line the student
held the sign. 100 Similarly, in Fraser, where a student was suspended

96. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
97. Id. at 506.
98. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum,
and the civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social
order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate
the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.”).
99. Morse, 551 U.S. at 397.
100. Id. Morse has come under fire from civil libertarians. See, e.g., ACLU Slams Supreme
Court Decision in Student Free Speech Case, ACLU (June 25, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/aclu-slams-supreme-court-decision-student-free-speech-case (quoting ACLU National Legal Director Steven R. Shapiro as saying, “The Court’s ruling imposes new restric-
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for delivering a lewd student council nomination speech, Justice
Brennan ignored the on-campus/off-campus distinction entirely, admitting that Fraser’s “speech may well have been protected had he
given it in school but under different circumstances, where the school’s
legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse
were less weighty.” 101
The Court’s student speech precedents are littered with references to the schoolhouse and to officials’ authority being limited to
“conduct in the schools.” 102 But, in most cases, the references to the
four walls of the schoolhouse are cabined by the Court’s reminders
that the school’s educational relationship to its students is salient. In
Tinker, the Court distinguished between speech inside and outside of
the “schoolhouse gate,” 103 but analyzed the students’ free speech
rights in the context of students’ and teachers’ liberty interest in an
education free of government intrusion and able to prepare the
“young for citizenship.” 104 Later in the opinion, Justice Fortas seemed
to return to the school-centric focus when he stated that student
rights embraced not only classroom hours, but also the cafeteria, the
ball field, and any part of the “campus during the authorized
hours.” 105 He then reminded us that “[s]chool officials do not possess
absolute authority over their students” irrespective of their physical
location 106 and what mattered was disruption to the educational mission. 107 Similarly, in Fraser, the Court appeared to suggest that the issue was what kind of speech was allowed “in the classroom or in
school assembly,” 108 but then clarified that Fraser’s vulgar speech
could be limited not because of where he spoke, but because a school
has an interest in protecting minors from his arguably lewd com-

tions on student speech rights and creates a drug exception to the First Amendment.”). It
is beyond the scope of this paper to either join the chorus of that criticism or defend the
Court’s analysis.
101. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
102. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507. See also id. at 511
(“state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism”); id. at 512–13 (referring
to students’ rights “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours”); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 (“A high school assembly or classroom is no
place for a sexually explicit monologue . . . .”).
103. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
104. Id. at 507 (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
105. Id. at 512–13.
106. Id. at 511.
107. Id. at 513.
108. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The determination
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly
rests with the school board.”).
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ments. 109 A similar analysis held sway in Kuhlmeier. In that case, officials were permitted to censor two articles in the school newspaper
not because students created and distributed the newspaper on campus, but only because the paper was part of the pedagogical mission
of a journalism class, bore the imprimatur of the school, and the censorship was “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 110 The fulcrum upon which the merits of the First Amendment defenses were decided, therefore, was the relationship of the
school to the student qua student.
If a campus presence was essential to lawful school discipline, all
an aggressor would have to do to avoid punishment is take his behavior just outside the gate. This reality has moved most courts to ignore the on-campus/off-campus dichotomy and assess off-campus
student speech based on its on-campus effects. 111 But, if location is
not a valid distinction for determining the lawfulness of school discipline, what may have animated the decisions of those jurisdictions that
honor the dichotomy are the different relationships between the
school and the students involved (where a student acts qua student),
for which an on-campus or off-campus location is a simple heuristic.
In Thomas v. Board of Education, for example, students could not be
punished for creating and distributing off campus a magazine inspired by National Lampoon. 112 Nor could the students in Shanley v.
Northeast Independent School District be punished for creating and distri109. Id. at 684–85. Compare id. at 685 (“The First Amendment does not prevent the
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”) (emphasis added), with id.
(“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed
towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”) (emphasis added). This language suggests that the important factors are the audience and the educational mission. The location is relevant to, but not determinative of, the Court’s analysis.
110. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268, 271–73 (1988).
111. Refusing to differentiate between student speech taking place on-campus and
speech taking place off-campus, a number of courts have applied the test in Tinker when
analyzing off-campus speech brought onto the school campus. See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch.
Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998) (student disciplined for an article printed in an
underground newspaper that was distributed on school campus); LaVine v. Blaine Sch.
Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (student expelled for poem composed off-campus
and brought onto campus by the student); Sullivan v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d
1071, 1075–77 (5th Cir. 1973) (student punished for authoring article printed in underground newspaper distributed off campus, but near school grounds); Killion v. Franklin
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (student disciplined for
composing degrading top-ten list distributed via email to school friends, who then brought
it onto campus; author had been disciplined before for bringing top-ten lists onto campus); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–90 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(applying Tinker to mock obituary website constructed off campus).
112. 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979).
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buting a so-called “underground” newspaper. 113 In these paradigmatic cases, the publications’ creators may have been students, but they
were not acting qua students when they wrote parodies or opinion
pieces on contemporary political topics. They were humorists and political activists, identities not connected to the youth’s membership in
the school community. The on-campus/off-campus distinction may
simply have been easy shorthand for determining when students express themselves qua students and when they express themselves qua
citizens.
3. Most Lower Courts That Have Addressed the Issue Agree That the
Supreme Court Has Never Required a Campus Presence
The Supreme Court has never had occasion to address a school’s
disciplinary authority over off-campus cyberattacking and cyberbullying. I have interpreted the Court’s precedents to mean the Court’s
school speech cases apply regardless of any off-campus origin, and
most lower courts, some of which have been confronted with cyberattacking cases, agree. 114
Some circuits apply Tinker without considering where the speech
originated. In LaVine v. Blaine School District, for example, the Ninth
Circuit upheld a school’s authority to expel a student who wrote a
graphic and violent poem about killing his classmates. 115 He wrote his
poem off campus, after school hours and not as part of any schoolrelated activity, but he brought the poem to school on his own. 116 He
showed his work to a teacher, who took the poem to a school counselor, who in turn set up a meeting with the vice principal. 117 The student was expelled as a result. 118 Without regard to the off-campus
origin of the poem, the Ninth Circuit determined that the poem fell
under Tinker and not under any of the Supreme Court’s exceptions to
its “material and substantial” disruption standard. 119 After all, neither
Fraser nor Kuhlmeier applied because the poem was not vulgar, lewd, or
obscene, and the poem was not part of any school-sponsored event. 120
113. 462 F.2d 960, 964, 975 (5th Cir. 1972).
114. See supra Part III.A.2.
115. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990.
116. Id. at 983.
117. Id. at 984.
118. Id. at 986.
119. Id. at 989–92.
120. Id. at 988–89. The rule that Tinker applies to all student speech that does not fit
within the Fraser, Kuhlmeier, or Morse exceptions is a reasonable reading of Supreme Court
precedents and was established in the Ninth Circuit in Chandler v. McMinnville School District, 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The court upheld the school’s authority to expel the student because
of a reasonable fear that a poem about killing a classmate would disrupt the school. 121
The LaVine analysis is common in other jurisdictions. In Shanley,
for example, the Fifth Circuit applied Tinker to an underground
newspaper that students created and distributed off campus, but
where a few copies showed up on campus. 122 And in Boucher v. School
Board, the Seventh Circuit upheld discipline for a student who wrote
an article off campus which appeared in an underground newspaper
that was distributed on campus. 123 In these and other cases, courts
have gone straight to applying Tinker’s substantial disruption standard
to determine the merit of a First Amendment defense to a school’s
disciplinary authority. They all ignored the lack of a campus presence. In O.Z. v. Board of Trustees, the district court stated explicitly
that “the fact that Plaintiff’s creation and transmission of the [speech]
occurred away from school property does not necessarily insulate her
from school discipline.” 124 After all, the mere fact that the student’s
conduct took place off campus does not mean that it cannot “create a
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption” in the school environment. 125
In many student Internet speech cases, courts have taken an extra step before reaching the Tinker test. For Tinker to apply, the origin
of the speech is part of a threshold question: there must be a connection, or nexus, between the speech and the school, and the off121. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 992.
122. Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964, 970–71 (5th Cir. 1972).
123. 134 F.3d 821, 822, 824, 827–28 (7th Cir. 1998). See also Killion v. Franklin Reg’l
Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448–49, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (applying Tinker where student was disciplined for composing degrading top-ten list and distributing it off campus to
friends via email, and where one recipient brought the list to campus); Emmett v. Kent
Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (applying Tinker to a website created by a student off campus that contained mock obituaries of classmates); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177–78, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying Tinker to a website created by a student off campus that contained criticism of
school authorities, when another student accessed the website at school and showed it to a
teacher); O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs., No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL 4396895, at *1, *3–4 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 9, 2008) (applying Tinker to uphold a suspension where a student created a video off
campus during spring break that depicted a graphic dramatization of a teacher’s murder
and then posted the video on the Internet); Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275,
277, 285–87 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (applying Tinker to an underground newsletter distributed on campus).
124. O.Z., 2008 WL 4396895, at *4.
125. Id.; see also Killion, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (holding that the court need not consider
plaintiff’s argument that a heightened standard applies to speech occurring off school
grounds because “[t]he overwhelming weight of authority has analyzed student speech
(whether on or off campus) in accordance with Tinker”).
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campus origin of the speech is one factor that weighs against a finding
of a sufficient nexus. This is simply another way of determining if the
student was acting qua student, or as someone independent of the
school community.
For example, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education, a student
created, for his online profile, an AIM 126 icon of a gun firing at a
man’s head with red dots of “blood.” 127 Beneath the icon, the student
wrote “Kill Mr. VanderMolen,” referring to the student’s English
teacher. 128 Another student showed a copy of the icon to the teacher,
who then brought it to the school’s principal. 129 The court asked
whether anything created off campus could foreseeably “reach the
school property” and whether the evidence showing that it did even
mattered. 130 In Doninger v. Niehoff, a student sent an email to her
peers and their parents and posted comments to her blog criticizing
school officials for canceling a school event. She implored her peers
to contact school officials and complain. 131 The message’s purpose,
then, was to have the criticism reach campus, thus bringing the
speech under Tinker. 132
Most recently, in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth
Circuit upheld a school’s discipline of a student for engaging in offcampus cyberattacking of another student, in part, because there was
a sufficient connection between the conduct and the school. 133 A student had created a MySpace discussion group called “S.A.S.H.,” which
stood for “Students Against Sluts Herpes,” referring to a fellow student, Shay N. 134 The cyberattacker may have “pushed her computer’s
keys in her home, but she knew that the electronic response would
be, as it in fact was, published beyond her home” and would reach

126. AIM refers to AOL Instant Messenger, an instant messaging service run by America
Online. AOL INSTANT MESSENGER, http://www.aim.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
127. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
128. Id. at 36.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 39. The panel was divided over whether it must first assess the foreseeability that the student’s speech would reach school authorities. The panel declined to decide
if such a determination was necessary because it agreed that it was reasonably foreseeable
the icon would reach the school. Id.
131. 527 F.3d 41, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that Tinker was satisfied because it was
clear from the purpose of the message that it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech
would reach the school and cause a material and substantial disruption).
132. Id. at 50–52.
133. 652 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]here such speech has a sufficient nexus
with the school, the Constitution is not written to hinder school administrators’ good faith
efforts to address the [bullying] problem.”).
134. Id. at 567.
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and disrupt the school. 135 The attacks came from students in her high
school, were directed at a fellow student, and occurred in a group
called “Students Against Sluts Herpes,” thus indicating a strong school
connection. 136
In each of these cases, off-campus speech was ultimately subjected to the school’s disciplinary authority because of the nexus between the speech and the school’s educational environment and mission, not merely a connection to the school’s geographic boundaries.
The absence of this nexus also explains why a school could not discipline the student in Mahaffey v. Aldrich. 137 In that case, a student
created a website directing his readers to select any person and to kill
in a particularly gruesome manner described in detail on the website. 138 The district court found no evidence of any connection between the website and the school, particularly because the student’s
calls for violence were generic, independent of the school community, and too general to be reasonably directed at any particular member of the school. 139 As such, in cases where a school could punish an
online aggressor and even in cases where schools could not, the geographic origin and geographic reach of the speech is irrelevant.
When the speech originated on campus, the nexus to the school is
obvious; when the speech originated off campus, the nexus is established by reference to the subject of the speech, the intent of the
speaker, the intended audience, and other factors. These factors establish that the speaker was acting qua student, rather than just a
member of the community at large. That critical comments originated off campus was never an a priori barrier to a school’s disciplinary authority.
The Third Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Layshock v. Hermitage School District 140 does not complicate or challenge this theory. In
that case, the court rejected a school’s authority to discipline a student for creating an online parody of the school’s principal, but it did
so not because there was an insufficient nexus—the school admitted
that there was no nexus and no effect on the school environment. 141
The school conceded Tinker’s relevance at oral argument and, instead, attempted to justify its discipline under Fraser’s lewdness excep135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 573.
Id.
236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Id. at 781–82.
Id. at 784–86.
650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Id. at 207, 214.
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tion to Tinker. 142 That argument had no legs to stand on; Fraser involved lewd speech at a school-sponsored assembly and thus implicated speech that could reasonably be assumed to bear the school’s
approval. 143
4. The Internet’s Role in Society and Education Makes Any Campus
Presence Requirement Antiquated
So far, I have argued that none of the Supreme Court’s studentspeech cases were based on an on-campus/off-campus distinction and
that most courts that have interpreted those precedents agree. Even
if that were not the case, a bright-line geographic distinction no longer makes sense. The distinction falls apart when confronted by the
effects the Internet can have on our physical world and by the Internet’s essential role in modern education. Even if a campus presence
used to be required for lawful school discipline of student speech,
that requirement should be dropped given the emergence and
growth of the Internet as a social and educational tool.
Indeed, several courts and scholars have already commented on
the pervasiveness of computer and Internet use in our daily lives, a
conclusion based on incontrovertible data. 144 Studies show that the
Internet and other cyber and digital technologies have replaced traditional media in everything from entertainment145 and advertising 146 to
buying coffee 147 and socializing. 148 This is because the popularity of

142. See id. at 219. At oral argument, the school district conceded that it was “relying
solely on the fact that Justin created the profile of Trosch, and not arguing that it created
any substantial disruption in the school.” Id.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 80–86.
144. See, e.g., People v. Rocco, 766 N.Y.S.2d 58, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to conduct business in contemporary society without
the use of or access to a computer); Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legitimacy, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 205, 211 (2010) (discussing the “global impact” of the Internet).
145. See, e.g., Chris Albrecht, More People Watching TV Shows Online, GIGAOM (Oct. 15,
2007, 12:37 PM), http://gigaom.com/video/more-people-watching-tv-shows-online/ (noting that research by the Conference Board Consumer Research Center has found that the
number of people who watch television online has increased since 2006 and is likely to
continue growing).
146. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Google’s Ad Targeting Goes Behavioral, S.F. GATE (Mar. 11,
2009,
11:50
AM),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/techchron/detail? blogid=19&entry_id=36840 (discussing Google’s plans to implement user-specific advertising
based on Internet usage).
147. See Molly McHugh, How to Buy Starbucks Coffee with Your iPhone, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/how-to-buy-starbucks-coffee-withyour-iphone/ (discussing Starbucks’s app allowing users to pay for coffee with their smartphones).
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the computer and the Internet has increased to pervasive levels in the
last ten years. In 2008, the population of the United States was over
303 million and over 220 million Americans (72.6 percent) were online. 149
In part because the Internet has come to pervade our daily lives,
it has taken on an increasingly salient role in education. Secondary
school teachers have integrated digital technologies into their classrooms through email exchanges, 150 speaking with and learning from
students in other countries, 151 and accessing research tools, 152 for example. There are countless websites aimed at further integrating the
Internet into the classroom 153 and all levels of government are working with outside donors to provide computers and Internet access to
public schools. 154 All of these programs encourage both the integration of the Internet into the classroom and the use of the Internet as
an educational tool at home. If it ever was, the “school environment,”
to use Justice Fortas’s term in Tinker, 155 is no longer defined by the
four walls of the classroom. It extends as far as the Internet tools it
deploys to teach students how to add and subtract, read and write,
think and grow.
This is not a radical argument. Professor Mary Anne Franks argues that since our pervasive online presence allows “sexual harassment in one setting [that] produce[s] harms in another,” 156 traditional sexual harassment law that has so far protected victimized women

148. Facebook, for example, has more than 800 million active users, and more than 50
percent of those users log on to Facebook on any given day. Statistics, People on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Nov. 5,
2011).
149. United States of America Internet Usage and Broadband Usage Report, INTERNET WORLD
STATS: USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/
us.htm (last updated Feb. 14, 2011).
150. Pamela U. Silva et al., E-mail: Real-life Classroom Experiences with Foreign Languages, 23
LEARNING & LEADING TECH. 10, 10–12 (1996).
151. Id.
152. Chris Davis, The I-Search Paper Goes Global: Using the Internet as a Research Tool, 84
ENG. J. 27, 27–33 (1995).
153. See, e.g., INTERNET 4 CLASSROOMS, http://www.internet4classrooms.com/introducing_i4c.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (stating that the website is designed to assist
teachers in locating teaching resources on the Internet).
154. See Press Release, The White House, White House to Launch “Digital Promise” Initiative (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/whitehouse-launch-digital-promise-initiative (discussing initiative funded by the Department of
Education, Carnegie Corporation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation to increase
access to technology in schools).
155. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
156. Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657 (2012).
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in “single, protected settings” like the workplace under Title VII, the
school under Title IX, and, to some extent, at home and in prison, 157
inadequately captures what modern sex harassment looks like. Professor Franks argues persuasively for a multiple-setting conception of
sexual harassment, because cyberharassment can have just as deleterious an effect on a victim’s ability to function in the workplace as traditional forms of workplace harassment. 158 This is true of any kind of
cyberharassment, which can have the same kind of harmful effect on
a victim’s ability to function in the physical world. Whether a peer
uses his or his victim’s Facebook page to make derogatory comments
questioning the victim’s sexuality, or uses Instagram to post altered
graphic photos depicting the victim in compromising situations, or
takes to Twitter to call a young girl a “dyke,” these attacks can cause
even the strongest student to fear further humiliation, lose interest in
attending school, and close herself off from a world she feels is increasingly hostile. She becomes unable to learn, participate in extracurricular activities, or participate in school society. Her educational
rights have been denied her, which can constitute a civil rights violation, 159 regardless of where her victimization occurred.
5. Replacing the Campus Presence Requirement
The circuits are not really of two minds when it comes to the
threshold on-campus/off-campus distinction. For jurisdictions like
the Ninth Circuit that have always considered the locus of origin irrelevant, a campus presence was never required, and this view is the best
interpretation of Tinker and its progeny. 160
The Second Circuit’s search for a nexus may represent an extra
step, 161 but the result will be the same. The role of the Internet in
modern education and the very real effects a fellow student’s cyberbullying has on a victim’s ability to learn inside the school means that
any off-campus origin of cyberbullying should be no barrier to a
school’s disciplinary authority. The circuit court’s use of campus
presence evidence may just be a shorthand way of determining if the
157. Id. at 659.
158. See id. (arguing that “sexual harassment in cyberspace produces harm that is equal
to or more severe than sexual harassment that occurs in traditionally protected spaces”).
159. See Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s Expanded
Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded Programs, 67 MD. L.
REV. 358, 376–77 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Monroe County, 526 U.S. 629 (1999), that in certain circumstances a school can be liable for indifference to student-on-student sexual harassment).
160. See supra Part III.A.3.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 127–132.
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aggressing student is acting qua student. To their credit, no court to
follow the Second Circuit’s reasoning has ever found the off-campus
origin determinative. In Thomas, for example, students who created
an independent, nonschool-sponsored magazine modeled after the
National Lampoon could not be punished for its sexual content not
because the magazine was created off campus, 162 but rather because
the students “deliberately designed” all activities to take place off
campus, made every effort to make sure copies never showed up on
campus, and made no mention of their peers, teachers, or school
community. 163 The students were not just expressing themselves off
campus, they were divorcing their expression from the school context
in its entirety. They were not acting qua students. This purposeful
lack of any connection to the school made Thomas a non-student
speech case, and thus out of the school’s disciplinary reach.
If my theory is correct that what matters for school disciplinary
authority has always been students acting qua students, then neither
the Ninth nor the Second Circuit needs to change the way it determines the threshold question of whether that authority exists for cyberaggression. The on-campus/off-campus distinction is, at a minimum, antiquated. To determine when an adolescent is acting as a
student of the “school environment,” even the Second Circuit does
not simply look at the geographic origin of the speech. Instead, it
looks to the relationship between the speaker and the school. 164
In cyberattacking and cyberbullying cases, the school nexus
should similarly be determined by the relationship between the aggressor and his victim. Peer-to-peer cyberattacking and cyberbullying
cases involve an aggressor targeting a victim he knows from school.
The cyberexpression would not exist but for their attendance at the
same school. 165 If a student attacks a victim he knows only because he
is a student at his school, then he is acting as a member of the school
community. This stands in contrast to an adolescent who attacks a
victim he knows from family or church; in those cases, the aggressor is
acting as a member of an entirely different community.
This theory has a number of advantages. First, it bridges the apparent circuit divide about the role of the geographic origin of the

162. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979).
163. Id. at 1050. Some activity related to the magazine did take place at school; however, the court found that such activity was de minimis. Id.
164. See supra Part III.A.3.
165. See, e.g., J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 865 (Pa. 2002) (“Importantly, the web site was aimed not at a random audience, but at the specific audience of
students and others connected with this particular School District . . . .”).
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speech. 166 The Ninth Circuit ignores where the speech originated because Supreme Court precedents make the on-campus/off-campus
distinction irrelevant and because speech that originates off campus
can still have a substantial effect on the school environment. 167 Conversely, the Second Circuit looks to the relationship between the offcampus speaker and the school to determine if it is reasonably foreseeable that the off-campus speech would reach campus. 168 When the
speaker and target are part of the same school community, and especially when the speech occurs over the Internet or other digital technologies, it is reasonable to expect the speech to reach campus, thus
obviating the need for the Second Circuit’s threshold question.
Second, the relationship test avoids the difficulties associated
with a campus presence requirement in the Internet age. The pervasiveness of the Internet in daily life and in education makes it overwhelmingly likely that any type of cyberexpression aimed at the school
community will find its way to campus. And, as Professor Franks has
argued in the workplace context, no longer can we assume that the
locus of the harassment will always be the locus of its effects. The Internet age makes that assumption antiquated. 169 Third, the relationship test uses a principle that has a solid foundation in other areas of
law. In contract law, fiduciary duties are established by particular relationships between parties; 170 at common law, the relationship between parties determines whether a hired party was an employee; 171
and, in negligence actions, the existence of a duty of care hinged on
the relationship between the parties involved; 172 to name just a few
examples.
166. See supra Part III.A.3 (describing the different approaches of the Ninth and Second
circuits).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 115–121.
168. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
169. See Franks, supra note 156, at 659 (“The multiple-setting conception advocated by
this Article recognizes that the action and the effect of sexual harassment can be split, an
increasingly common reality in the Internet age.”).
170. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (noting the “established doctrine that [a fiduciary] duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties”).
171. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992)
(“‘Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party . . . .’” (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
751–52 (1989))).
172. See, e.g., Hoidas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 09 C 7409, 2010 WL 1790864, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2010) (“The law of agency does not impute a duty that the principal
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But, the student acting qua student, as evidenced by the relationship between the aggressor and his victim, is not determinative of a
school’s authority to punish him for cyberattacking. It answers a threshold question of whether a bad actor could be punished by his
school for conduct done outside of school and online. Once this
threshold is crossed, a court’s analysis of the merit of a free speech
defense to that punishment should depend on the nature of the conduct at issue, that is, the difference between single-incident cyberattacking and repeated cyberbullying.
B. Speech/Action Distinction on the Internet
It should now be clear that the off-campus origin of cyberattacking and cyberbullying should not be an a priori barrier to a school’s
disciplinary authority. In the Internet age, regulating student speech
based on the location of its origin, dissemination, or access ignores
the sea change that cyberspace has brought to modern life and education. But, even if that were not the case—if a geographic definition
were possible and reflected the Supreme Court’s intentions in Tinker,
Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse—suggesting that student cyberattacking,
cyberbullying, and cyberexpression generally is pure speech, with no
element of action, should not raise a second barrier to a school’s disciplinary authority. The speech/action distinction may pepper First
Amendment scholarship, but these categories are “elusive” and unhelpful. 173
The notion that the First Amendment protects speech, not action, 174 is a common element to much free speech rhetoric, but it is
the beginning of any analysis, not the end. The distinction, in part,
arguably explains the difference between cases like Cohen v. California, 175 where the Court reversed a conviction for entering a courthouse wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the
Draft,” 176 and United States v. O’Brien, where the Court upheld the

owes to a third party onto an agent. Instead, the duty of care flows from the relationship
between the parties.”) (citations omitted).
173. Citron, supra note 15, at 100.
174. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 209 (2d ed.
1996) (discussing how the Supreme Court has vacillated on the speech/conduct distinction).
175. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
176. Id. at 16–17, 26 (“‘The defendant did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in,
nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit or threaten to commit any act
of violence.’” (quoting People v. Cohen, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. (1969),
rev’d sub nom. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971))).
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prosecution of a protestor who burned his selective service card. 177
The First Amendment protects expression, not the “noncommunicative” element of burning a government document. 178
Even assuming this distinction has merit as a governing principle
of free-speech law, 179 the speech/action distinction is obscure in almost every context and especially with respect to the Internet. 180 As
Professor Danielle Keats Citron has argued, the Internet both aggregates words into action—for example, “hacking and denial of service
attacks [] are accomplished by sending communications to other
computers” 181—and disaggregates communications into components
that operate as actions, as with online sexual harassers who refuse to
leave cues to mitigate the victim’s fear. 182 In other words, a threat that
arrives anonymously and without any indication of a joking tone “engender[s] serious fear that . . . [the threat] will be carried out offline.” 183 The absence of these cues evidences an intent to “terrorize
the victim,” which can “convert [online] expression into criminal
conduct.” 184
To suggest, then, that cyberattacking and cyberbullying are examples of pure speech, meriting greater First Amendment protection,
is a losing argument. A Facebook page that is created solely to terrorize a student or an online polling page created to rate the attractiveness of a victim may be communicated from one computer to another, but they are no more examples of pure speech than face-to-face
threats, intimidation, and harassment. In any event, the inquiry into
the merit of a free speech defense does not end with categorizing given behavior as speech. Even in the context of political speech, where

177. 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968) (“[T]he governmental interest . . . [is] limited to the
noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct.”).
178. See id. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.”).
179. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829–30 (2d ed.
1988). Professor Tribe has criticized the speech/action distinction as lacking analytical
substance and being impossible for any court to define. See also Frederick M. Lawrence,
Resolving the Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist
Speech, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 692–93 (1993) (discussing the limitations of the
speech/action distinction).
180. Citron, supra note 15, at 100 n.281.
181. Id. at 99.
182. Id. at 100.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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First Amendment protections are at their “zenith,” 185 such speech can
be regulated or curtailed for any number of reasons.
IV. ANALYZING FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES TO SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
FOR CYBERATTACKING AND CYBERBULLYING—TWO WAYS FORWARD
At this point, both Amelia’s and Zachary’s threshold objection to
school discipline has failed. Regardless of the off-campus origin of
their speech and other conduct, a school can still discipline them as
members of the school community, as students qua students who
chose their victims because of their school connection. Now, the cases can proceed to the merits of their First Amendment defenses. For
Amelia, her future lies with the Court’s student speech cases; for Zachary, his fate lies with the harassment model.
Three factors suggest that we need distinct and more constructive ways to determine the merit of free speech defenses to punishment for cyberattacking and cyberbullying: the differences between
single-incident cyberattacking and repeated cyberbullying, 186 the transcendent roles played by the Internet in our daily lives and in our
schools, 187 and the inadequacy of the on-campus/off-campus and
speech/action distinctions 188 as governing First Amendment principles. This Article aims to fill that void. I propose two answers for
two different problems. First, I suggest that whether a school’s disciplinary authority over identity-based, single-incident cyberattacking
impinges on a student’s First Amendment rights should be governed
by the consistent rationale underlying all of the Court’s student
speech cases—namely, a narrowly defined effects test that balances
student expression against the school’s ability to teach its students
successfully. As I argue elsewhere, Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse
may use different standards for restricting different types of student
speech; but, in each case, the Court is concerned with the same thing:
the effects of given student expression on the school’s ability to
189
teach. Tinker accepts the connection between impingements on the
rights of students and educational disruption, 190 and the individual,
185. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22, 425 (1988).
186. See supra Part II.
187. See supra Part III.A.4.
188. See supra notes 179–185.
189. See Ari Ezra Waldman, And All Those Like You: Identity-Based Aggression and Student
Speech, A New Way Forward, 77 MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Waldman, And
All Those Like You].
190. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (“Certainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
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group, and community harm caused by identity-based bullying and
cyberbullying most definitely impairs the educational rights and op192
Second, because anti-gay
portunities of victims 191 and the school.
bullying and cyberbullying amount to egregious harassment in school,
I argue that just like the First Amendment does not stand in the way
of harassment and stalking statutes, free speech rights should not
stand in the way of a school’s disciplinary authority over its students
who commit the same actions. 193
A. Cyberattacking and Tinker
We have already discussed that a cyberaggressor’s free speech defense deserves a different analysis than a cyberbully’s defense due to
the differing nature and frequency of the conduct. I argue that the
Court’s effects test underlying all its student speech cases is the best
way to determine if the First Amendment blocks a school’s authority
to discipline a cyberaggressor.
1. Clarifying the Standard
By now, it should be clear that the off-campus origin of such aggression is irrelevant. 194 It should also be clear that the speech/action
distinction common in First Amendment discourse has no place in
this analysis. 195 Beyond that, clear instruction is hard to come by.
Tinker’s “material and substantial” disruption standard is highly factspecific, a feature of the law that likely explains why neither the Supreme Court nor the various circuit courts have stated what kind of
disruption is sufficient and when such a disruption is reasonably foreseeable. Pennsylvania’s state supreme court has said the disruption
must be more than “some mild distraction” but need not be “complete chaos,” 196 but many incidents on any given school day could fall
somewhere between those extremes. Nevertheless, while no factintensive inquiry lends itself to bright line rules and lower courts have

would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.”) (quoting Burnside v. Byars 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966))).
191. See infra Part IV.A.1.
192. Waldman, And All Those Like You, supra note 189.
193. See infra Part IV.B.
194. See supra Part III.A.1.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 179–185.
196. J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 868 (Pa. 2002).
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come to many divergent conclusions, 197 the case law is not without instruction. 198 But instruction as to what? To the extent that a given
event causes a substantial disruption, Tinker’s standard was developed
to balance students’ political speech rights and the negative effects of
“disorder” in school caused by a mass student protest. 199 Cyberaggression neither involves political speech nor student protests, so that
standard must be clarified. To do that, we need look no further than
the Court’s other student speech cases.
Face-to-face aggression and cyberaggression are targeted attacks
that affect the victim’s physical and mental health, his ability to function as a competent member of society, and his access to education. 200
This kind of aggression, if left untouched by a school’s disciplinary
authority, also creates an atmosphere of intimidation throughout the
entire school, making it impossible for students to feel safe and,
therefore, impossible for them to learn. Anti-gay bullying is a special
breed of harassment; it attacks a victim because of his identity. This
not only affects the victim qua individual, but it is an affront to those
who share his identity and, for that matter, all minorities. 201 To permit the kind of attack on gay identity bound up with the statement
“All faggots must die” scrawled on a person’s Facebook profile picture
is to conceive of the individual target of that speech—the person
197. Compare e.g., Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1159 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating a
school policy “condition[ing] distribution of all written materials on school premises upon
prior school review for censorship purposes”), with, e.g., Wiemerslage v. Me. Township
High Sch. Dist. 207, 29 F.3d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding a school loitering rule
on the grounds that the school’s concerns over safety and property damages outweighed
the incidental effect on student speech and assembly), and Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757,
763 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding the ability of a school to exclude a student from a student
council race because he made a rude comment about the assistant principal).
198. See infra Part IV.A.2.
199. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 & n.3 (1969)
(stating that a prohibition on expression must be motivated by more than a “mere desire
to avoid” the discomfort, disorder, and disruption associated with the expression at issue).
200. See King, supra note 15, at 851–52 (noting that cyberbulling can cause psychological harm and stress that “negatively impacts other areas of [adolescents’] psychological
and cognitive development” and “can spill over into victims’ social, academic, and family
lives”); see also Arne Duncan, U.S. Secretary of Education, The Fight to Stop Bullying, Remarks to the Anti-Defamation League National Leadership Conference (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://www.adl.org/education/Letter-adl-bullying-remarks.asp (“Our second principle is
that no school can be a great school until it is a safe school. My wife and I have two young
children. We want them to learn every day in school, but to do that, they must feel safe
first. You cannot do your best or concentrate academically if you are scared.”).
201. I expand upon this point, arguing that identity-based peer-to-peer aggression is a
special category of student speech that merits school discipline under any metric. See
Waldman, And All Those Like You, supra note 189; Citron, supra note 15, at 89 (“Such attacks also harm the community that shares the victim's race, gender, religion, or ethnicity—community members experience attacks as if the attacks happened to them.”).
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whose picture was defaced—as separate and apart from his community. His injury is not simply personal, but communal, an attack on his
very identity that says all gay people are unworthy of life. 202
A narrow reading of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard
would exclude almost all targeted aggression because, by definition,
the effects could not cause school-wide disorder or unrest like a protest. 203 While we can certainly imagine a particularly egregious case of
cyberaggression that bleeds into a face-to-face attack, which in turn
erupts into a massive fight, such incidents are rare and fail to account
for all the devastation to the student and the school beneath that high
threshold. But only a myopic interpretation of Tinker and its progeny
would restrict a school’s authority to discipline cyberaggressors to the
stereotypical “disorder” caused by a massive protest. First, the standard in Tinker may have been applied to protest, 204 but the Court was
concerned with any interference with “appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school” or the “work of the school.” 205 The school’s
disciplinary authority begins where any “conduct by the student . . .
materially disrupts classwork or involves . . . invasion of the rights of
others.” 206 A protest is only one way to do that. Peer-to-peer aggression “collid[es] with the rights of others” 207 and can impair a daily lesson plan when one student fears being near the other or fears raising

202. Citron, supra note 15, at 89 (describing the harmful effects of anti-gay bullying).
Catharine MacKinnon pioneered a similar view in the 1970s, arguing that sexual harassment of women in the workplace damages all women and that traditional tort remedies
are, therefore, inadequate. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 174–92 (1979); see also Kathryn Abrams,
The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1220 (1998)
(“[S]exual harassment as a practice rooted in a struggle between men and women in the
workplace that perpetuates both male control and the primacy of conventionally masculine norms, that genders both men and women through a variety of dynamics commensurate with their individual and subgroup based variations, and that interferes with the capacity both to define oneself as a subject and to seek less stereotypic or confining roles.”);
Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 693
(1997) (“Sexual harassment is a technology of sexism. It is a disciplinary practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both harasser and victim according to a system of gender norms . . . .”); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683, 1797 (1998) (explaining that sexual harassment jurisprudence “has failed large
numbers of people who are not subjected to sexual abuse, but whose competence as workers is constantly thrust into conflict with their identities as women or gendernonconforming men”).
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. A tiny one, at that. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (noting that “[o]nly a few of the
18,000 students in the school” participated, only five of whom were suspended).
205. Id. at 509.
206. Id. at 513.
207. Id.

742

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:705

his hand in class for fear of being attacked in the hall or online. That
is what the Fourth Circuit recently found in Kowalski v. Berkeley County
Schools. 208 And when a culture of fear pervades a school that sits idly
by when attacks go on in person or online, no one can teach anyone
anything, and the school turns into a prison. Second, Tinker applies
to all “personal intercommunication among . . . students,” not only
their politically-related ones. 209 At a minimum, then, Tinker accepts
that impingements on other students’ rights and impairments to discipline and education can occur when students interact with one
another beyond the political arena. Third, one of the values underlying the Court’s respect for the armband walkout was a school’s educational mission: to “discover[] truth” and to train the nation’s future
leaders. 210 No student can engage in the kind of free exchange of
ideas that Justice Brennan had in mind in Keyishian v. Board of Regents
as necessary for civic education when he fears what will happen to
him afterward. 211
These same effects on the school also animated the Court’s decisions in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse. If the purpose of American public education is to “prepare pupils for citizenship” or teach the “habits
212
and manners of civility,” permitting a student to deliver a graphically lewd speech winking toward a male student’s sexual prowess was inconsistent with that mission for a number of reasons: vulgar language
has no place in civilized debate, the school would become a model for
213
inappropriate behavior, and the speech itself would damage other
214
young students whom the school must teach and protect. It was the
effects of the speech, and their inconsistency with a school’s basic
educational mission, that brought Chief Justice Burger to this decision.
In holding that schools can determine that vulgar and lewd
speech would undermine the schools’ basic educational mission, Fraser not only tells us that the Court is concerned with effects on the
school when balancing the unique school environment with free
speech principles but also broadens the types of effects that merit re208. 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). Specifically, the court stated that, “[g]iven the targeted, defamatory nature of Kowalski’s speech, aimed at a fellow classmate, it created ‘actual or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption in the school.” Id. at 574.
209. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
210. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
211. 385 U.S. at 603 (noting that the “marketplace of ideas” of the classroom is most
effective in the absence of “authoritative selection”).
212. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
213. Id. at 683.
214. Id. at 683–84.
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striction. Tinker addressed protests, and the attendant disruption
possible from students getting up in the middle of class, agitating the
215
Fraser saw more subtle, but
school population, and inciting a riot.
no less damaging effects on a school that is put in the position of tacitly approving inappropriate language by allowing Fraser to go on
without punishment. That is, the reason the First Amendment allows
216
a student to “wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket” is the
effect Cohen’s jacket would have on the school. Teaching respectful
debate and civic engagement that does not interfere with the school’s
work has a positive effect on the school, its ability to teach, and its
reputation: it becomes a place of active learning, civility, and debate.
But allowing students to use vulgar and lewd language at a schoolsponsored event would make it impossible to teach the impropriety of
curse words and sexist language in civil society.
Kuhlmeier reaffirmed the Court’s focus on student speech that
handicaps a school’s ability to teach. There, the Court concluded
that schools cannot be forced into a position of countenancing inappropriate speech that bears the imprimatur of the school, whether inappropriate via bad grammar or vulgarity, or inappropriate for stu217
Otherwise, schools “would be unduly constrained
dent readers.
from fulfilling their role” of teaching cultural values, preparing students for professional training, and helping children adapt to the civi218
To the Court, this kind of student speech could have
lized world.
just as much effect on the school’s ability to teach as disciplinary
breakdowns associated with group protests and lewd and vulgar
speeches at school assemblies. All three forms of speech distract the
classroom from the curriculum, with all the attendant effects on the
school’s reputation, its practical and moral authority, and student
academic success.
The same analysis held sway in Morse. 219 The admittedly “silly”
banner could be interpreted to encourage illegal drug use, which is
220
The Court
anathematic to school and public policy, in general.
went to great lengths to remind us of the devastating effects of drug
use on young children; on the growing drug problem among American youth; and the time, money, and energy Congress, the states, and
local schools boards have spent on drug-prevention programs, not on215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504–08.
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Central Sch., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979).
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
Id. at 272.
Morse, 551 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 407.
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ly to establish the evils of drugs but also to highlight the incongruity
221
After all, students who
between drug-related speech and a school.
“celebrat[e] illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of
school administrators and teachers, … pose[] a particular challenge
222
for school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care”
because, like the school in Fraser, any overt or tacit approval of the
speech would put the school in the position of teaching lessons contrary to the curriculum, thus handicapping the school’s ability to
teach. Taken together, these conclusions paint a more accurate picture of what concerned the Court when it rejected student discipline
in Tinker, but blessed it in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse—the effects on
the school’s ability to teach its students.
Therefore, moving beyond the obscure confines of the “substantial disruption” standard to the consistent rationale underlying all of
the Court’s student speech cases to include serious infringements on
victims’ access to education, to a school’s culture of learning, and to
the victims’ community at large would retain fidelity to the language
and spirit of Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse. It would also reflect a
modern understanding of how we learn and the psychology of the
student, data that was not available in 1968. 223 Today, we know that
intimidation and fear prevent a victim from participating in the learning process, which includes anything from raising a hand in class to
answering a question to actually going to school in the first place. 224
When students feel unsafe or ridiculed, they will not learn, infringing
on their equal right to access an education at a public school. 225 We
also know that harassment not only affects the individual victim in this
way, but attacks his community. 226 To suggest that a school does not
have an interest in avoiding the disruption caused by group harm and

221. Id. at 407–08.
222. Id. at 408.
223. The breadth of literature in this area is too vast to cite in total. See generally MATT
JARVIS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EFFECTIVE LEARNING AND TEACHING (2005) (discussing modern educational psychology and how it can be used to increase teaching effectiveness);
Andrew Pollard, Towards a Sociology of Learning in Primary Schools, 11 BRIT. J. SOC. IN EDUC.
241 (1990) (discussing sociological issues regarding learning processes for primary education students); see also, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 70-24-100.3 (West 2005) (“The Legislature
finds that bullying has a negative effect on the social environment of schools, creates a
climate of fear among students, inhibits their ability to learn, and leads to other antisocial
behavior.”).
224. WILLARD, supra note 37, at 27–56.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 200–201.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 201–202.
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attendant minority unrest 227 is to ignore common sense and the basic
realities of the school environment.
2. How to Apply this Standard to Cyberattacking
A comprehensive review of the case law reveals several governing
principles relevant for courts faced with cyberattackers who invoke a
First Amendment defense. When the cyberattack takes on a decidedly
dark and targeted purpose of singling out a victim because of his
identity, the Court’s effects test should justify disciplining the aggressor.
First, there is no prerequisite that a specific number of people be
affected by the speech. Schools have lawfully punished students for
speech targeting one member of the school community 228 and none
of the litany of student speech cases has ever implied a number requirement to justify discipline. If we understood a homophobic cyberattack as more than simply a slight poke to the victim’s self-esteem,
but rather as an attack on the victim’s broader identity and his entire
community, then degrading the victim can be just as threatening as a
more overtly graphic attack.
Second, that students simply react to and discuss the speech at issue does not create a sufficient effect on a school’s ability to teach.
This principle has been clear since Tinker, where there was no substantial disruption because the armband protest merely caused students to poke fun at the protestors, make comments among themselves, and caused one student to feel self-conscious. 229 Nor did
student discussion and comments about a fake MySpace profile that a
student created to make fun of her principal create a sufficient effect

227. See Citron, supra note 15, at 89 (noting that the marginalization of individuals in
traditionally “subordinated groups” causes “deep psychological harm” that deprives individuals of their right to participate in society, provokes retaliation, and promotes community unrest); see also Frederick M. Lawrence, The Evolving Federal Role in Bias Crime Law Enforcement and the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 251, 258 & n.20
(2008) (describing how the “mere perception of a bias crime” incited the Crown Heights
riots in Brooklyn).
228. See, e.g., O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671, 2008
WL 4396895, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (noting that an administrative review panel
upheld disciplinary action against a student who created a threatening video targeting her
English teacher); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 34–37 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding
the suspension of a student for threatening a teacher via an instant messaging system).
229. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517–18 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting) (noting that the armbands provoked student comments and diverted attention from regular lessons). There was also evidence that a math class had been “wrecked”
by disputes between protesting students and nonprotesting students. Id. at 517.
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in J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District. 230 Here, the court was talking
about idle chatter, the banal “did you hear what happened” of the
schoolyard. 231 This case, then, does not speak to the very real reaction
that the community of gay students, their friends, and other minorities may have to a homophobic cyberattack in their community. Idle
chatter is one thing, but when a group of students are impaled on
their very identity by a racist or homophobic attack, the disruption to
the school is more pronounced.
Third, violent or directly threatening speech significantly impairs
the school’s ability to teach. In O.Z., for example, a district court
upheld a school’s removal and transfer of a student who created a
graphic dramatization of a murder and posted it online. 232 A teacher
found the video and informed the principal, but there was no evidence that the video had made its way to campus or that it affected
the teacher’s ability to work. 233 The court denied a preliminary injunction to stop the transfer because “the violent language and unusual photos depicted” in the video made it “reasonable” for school
officials to expect a serious disruption to school activities. 234 The
teacher could have been attacked or she could have been the subject
of ridicule from other students; either way, the court found, school
activities would be substantially affected. 235 And, in Wisniewski, where
a student created a chat icon depicting a teacher shot in the head, the
icon’s graphic nature was enough to show that “once made known to
the teacher and other school officials, [it] would foreseeably create a
risk of substantial disruption.” 236 These cases suggest that the mere
fact that a given incident of cyberattacking is particularly violent may
be enough under the Court’s effects test. 237
230. See J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931–32 (3d Cir. 2011).
231. See id. at 922–23 (describing the minor school disruptions caused by students discussing the profile).
232. See O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671, 2008 WL
4396895, at *1, *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (denying student’s request for a court order
mandating the school district to re-enroll the student).
233. See id. at *1 (describing the video at issue and the means by which it was discovered).
234. Id. at *3.
235. Id. at *4.
236. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007).
237. In LaVine, for example, the Ninth Circuit found that a school could suspend a student in an emergency because officials could reasonably expect a serious disruption to
stem from the student’s poem in which he graphically described his own suicide after
shooting his classmates. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989–90 (9th Cir. 2001).
Furthermore, in J.S. v. Bethlehem, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a substantial disruption under Tinker where a student’s website depicted a beheaded and blood-soaked
teacher with the caption, “Why Should She Die?” J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807
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A fourth factor judges consider when determining if cyberattacking has caused a sufficient effect on the school is the extent to which
school officials must spend time, energy, and effort responding to the
incident and controlling any damage it caused. In Doninger, the
Second Circuit found a substantial disruption was caused by a student’s email and blog post criticizing school officials for supposedly
canceling an event and exhorting her readers to call and complain
because administrators had to deal with “a deluge of calls and
emails.” 238 They responded to angry emails from parents who were
misled by the student’s misinformed email and some even came late
to work because of it. 239 Officials also had to take certain students out
of class because they were “all riled up” and had to address a threatened sit-in. 240 Likewise, in Boucher, where a student was expelled for
distributing a pamphlet with instructions on how to hack into the
school’s computers, 241 the Seventh Circuit found that the time and
money dedicated to fixing the problems caused by the pamphlet suggested that the school would likely prevail on any First Amendment
challenge. 242 The court noted that the school brought in computer
experts to assess the security of the system and changed all passwords
and access codes, suggesting a significant departure from normal dayto-day activities to respond to the student’s conduct. 243 In both these
cases, the students’ conduct forced school officials to set aside their
normal responsibilities and devote a significant amount of time to fixing any problems caused by the student. At a minimum, this constitutes disruption to administrators and teachers, which may be enough
for a “material and substantial” disruption finding under Tinker. This
is another fact-specific inquiry, but it suggests that the incident of cyberattacking would have to be sufficiently serious to occupy an
A.2d 847, 851 (Pa. 2002). When she heard of this website, the teacher was frightened and
could not teach for the rest of the year. Id. at 852. While LaVine and J.S. involved factors
over and beyond violent speech alone, the weight of the case law from other jurisdictions
suggests that, in most cases, additional inculpatory evidence is not necessary. See, e.g., Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 35–36 (concluding that the substantial disruption standard had been
met after a student created and shared a violent image, suggesting that his teacher should
be killed, despite findings that the student posed no true threat and had created the image
as a joke). But see Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 782, 784–85 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(finding no substantial disruption where a student’s website asked readers to kill a person
of their choosing in a particularly graphic fashion).
238. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2008).
239. Id. at 45–46.
240. Id. at 51.
241. Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 1998).
242. See id. at 827 (finding that the school suffered “tangible harm” and concluding
that, “more likely than not,” the school would prevail on the merits).
243. Id. at 827.
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amount of time similar to the hours wasted in Doninger and Boucher. A
racist or homophobic cyberattack can have real effects on not only
the victim, but on all minority students, suggesting that this kind of
hate and aggression may cause teachers and administrators to devote
significant time to address the community’s fears.
Fifth, there is some indication that an aggressor’s disciplinary
past can inform a school’s disciplinary decision and legitimize a
school’s fear of effects on the school due to that student’s conduct.
In LaVine, a student wrote a violent poem that described the shooting
of his classmates. 244 Upholding the school’s decision to immediately
expel the student, the Ninth Circuit singled out the student’s disciplinary past, his suicidal behavior, and his record of stalking his former
girlfriend as sufficient evidence that the school was reasonable to expect possible violence. 245 The poem in LaVine was particularly violent,
and, as we have seen, the more gruesome the speech, the more likely
school discipline will be appropriate. However, this factor could
make disciplining cyberattackers more likely because it would situate
a single incident in a pattern of conduct even when those previous incidents of misbehavior are not at issue.
And, sixth, the effects on the target of the aggression are relevant
for proving the sufficiency of any effects. Many student aggression
cases take into account the effect on the target or victim. In Kowalski,
the Fourth Circuit noted that the cyberattacks were “targeted, defamatory” and “forced [the victim] to miss school in order to avoid further abuse.” 246 The court was persuaded that the potential for continued abuse “was real” and that, if the conduct had gone
unpunished, it would have a “snowballing effect, in some cases resulting in ‘copycat’ efforts by other students or in retaliation for the initial” attack. 247 Discipline was warranted and not barred by the First
Amendment in that case, 248 but in J.C., for example, a court denied a
school disciplinary authority over a student whose video had a fleeting
and minimal impact on its target. 249
Any determination of effects is highly fact-specific, so this factor
might support discipline in some cases but counsel against it in oth-

244. Id. at 983–84.
245. Id. at 989–90.
246. Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 576–77.
249. See J.C. v. Beverly Hills Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(“[The victim] felt embarrassed, her feelings were hurt, and she temporarily did not want
to go to class. These concerns cannot, without more, warrant school discipline.”).
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ers. Weighing the effect on the victim has merit as a way of distinguishing between examples of the common gave-and-take among adolescents, on the one hand, and more harmful conduct, on the other.
And while this factor may make lawful discipline hinge on the dumb
luck of an aggressor who chooses a weak victim, that might be a good
thing. By making discipline less likely when an aggressor targets a
particularly strong victim whose high self-esteem would make him
able to withstand ridicule, this factor recognizes that cyberattacking,
like cyberbullying, requires an imbalance of power between the aggressor and the victim. But, this limited reach of the effects test
should be expanded to account for not only individual harm, but
group harm based on a cyberattack on a victim’s identity. 250 The
harm caused by “All Faggots Must Die,” for example, is not limited to
one gay teenager, but reaches to every gay member of his school and
every minority who could be the target of the next hateful attack. 251
B. Cyberbullying and Harassment
First Amendment freedoms are no less important for cyberbullies. Indeed, we are often reminded that free speech rights extend to
the worst among us. 252 Yet, no one enjoys an absolute right to free
speech; the right is balanced against competing interests in any given
circumstance. 253 A school’s authority to discipline single-incident cyberattackers only wilts in front of the First Amendment when the cyberattacking is indistinguishable from immature give-and-take among
adolescents. 254 A rule that allows punishment for the more than 70
percent of students who have engaged in a single incident of aggressive behavior 255 is simply overbroad, 256 wildly impractical, or both. 257

250. See supra text accompanying notes 201–202.
251. See Waldman, supra note 201.
252. See, e.g., Vill. of Skokie, v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978)
(“[T]he unpopularity of views, their shocking quality, their obnoxiousness, and even their
alarming impact is not enough. Otherwise, the preacher of any strange doctrine could be
stopped; the anti-racist himself could be suppressed, if he undertakes to speak in ‘restricted’ areas; and one who asks that public schools be open indiscriminately to all ethnic
groups could be lawfully suppressed, if only he choose to speak where persuasion is
needed most.” (quoting Rockwell v. Morris, 12 A.D.2d 272, 282 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961))).
253. E.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465–66 (1995)
(noting that in evaluating a restraint on speech, a court must balance the interest of the
state in maintaining order and efficiency against that of the citizen “in commenting upon
matters of public concern” (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968))).
254. See supra Part II.
255. Given that the definition of single-incident aggression is broad—sweeping in almost anything that can be cruel or harmful to others—and the likely under-reporting
among students who are willing to admit to bad behavior, most social scientists think this
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But an analysis that gives a school a fighting chance to discipline its
worst offenders recognizes the gravity of bullying and cyberbullying,
the state’s and school’s compelling interest in preventing such behavior, and the relative infrequency of real cyberbullying cases. I propose that given the similarities between the conduct, effects, and hostile environments caused by identity-based bullying and cyberbullying
in schools, on the one hand, and by standard harassing behavior, on
the other, we should determine the merit of a cyberbully’s First
Amendment defense to a school’s disciplinary authority like we would
analyze a harasser’s First Amendment defense to the liability imposed
by harassment statutes. 258 And while the Supreme Court has never
explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of harassment or stalking statutes, all evidence suggests that harassers enjoy little, if any, First
Amendment protection. 259 The same should be the case for Zachary,
our cyberbully.
My proposal ostensibly raises two doctrinal questions that must
be addressed at the outset. First, I argued above that the Supreme
Court’s student speech cases never entertained a bright line oncampus/off-campus distinction for a school’s disciplinary authority
because any suggestion of a campus presence requirement was merely
a proxy for the broader rule that schools maintain authority over their
students when they act qua students. 260 That principle, which subnumber is closer to 90 to 99 percent. See GLSEN Survey, supra note 51, at xvi (noting that
62.4 percent of students who were harassed or assaulted failed to report it to school administration; and about 90 percent of students participated in or heard derogatory and
harassing remarks about LGBT students).
256. A statute is overbroad if, in banning unprotected speech, it sweeps in protected
speech. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–19 (2003) (“The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regarding the standards for facial
challenges. The showing that a law punishes a ‘substantial’ amount of protected free
speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep,’ suffices to invalidate
all enforcement of that law, ‘until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation
so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected
expression.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 508 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
257. See Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of Criminal Law
in Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2009) (suggesting that an expansive regime of criminal liability for cyberbullying would be unworkable and have little
impact in discouraging cyberbullies).
258. For a description of state harassment and stalking statutes and their application to
cyberbullying, see id. at 15–38.
259. For a discussion of the application of First Amendment principles to harassment,
see Kenneth L. Marcus, Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism, 16
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1028 (2008).
260. See supra Part III.A.
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jected cyberattackers to school punishment, applies equally to cyberbullies. Therefore, the argument goes, treating cyberbullies, who act
qua students just as much as cyberattackers, outside Tinker and its
progeny disproves my student qua student theory. I disagree. Singleincident cyberattackers are still acting qua students by directing their
aggression against members of the school community they only know
because they are students. Undoubtedly, cyberbullies do the same.
But, unlike cyberattackers, cyberbullies are not just students; they are
harassers. A cyberattacker acts qua student because he acts against
someone he knows from school; his behavior is sometimes characterized by the common give-and-take among immature and sometimes
mean adolescents. The average cyberbully takes his conduct to
another level, whereby his repeated behavior affects his victim in profoundly more serious ways and, as a result, the cyberbully develops a
dual persona. The cyberbully is indeed a student, but the character
and egregiousness of his conduct make him primarily a harasser. 261
He is no longer solely acting qua student.
Second, one could argue that if cyberbullies have free speech
rights at all, the contours of those rights should be determined
through the Supreme Court’s student speech cases regardless of the
nature of the students’ conduct. This argument posits that, at bottom, Tinker and its progeny govern all student speech regardless of its
nature, gravity, and effects. I have already addressed this concern.
Tinker is powerful precedent and may merit rejuvenation as the protector of student speech rights, but neither Tinker nor any student
speech case decided through its lens was based on repeated, targeted
student speech. The precedent is, therefore, ill-equipped to address
the kind of constant barrage of harassing behavior that characterizes
the conduct of bullies and cyberbullies.
These objections aside, I argue that anti-gay bullying and cyberbullying in schools create a hostile educational environment through
harassment based on sex or sexual nonconformity. That puts bullies’
and cyberbullies’ behavior more in line with standard harassers or
stalkers, rather than student speakers. The striking similarity between
harassment and bullying, together with the similarly situated victims
and the obvious dissimilarity between single-incident attacking and
repeated bullying, suggests that identity-based cyberbullying and harassment merit similar treatment. Other scholars have discussed how

261. See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 2–3. For a learned discussion of the argument that updated harassment and stalking laws should not be applied to cyberbullies,
see id. at 15–45.
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and to whom to attach liability for bullying and cyberbullying. 262 With
respect to potential free speech defenses to that liability, courts
should remember that harassers, who engage in nearly identical conduct as bullies, enjoy little, if any, First Amendment protections. And
while there is little case law available to define that boundary clearly, I
argue that any speech restrictions imposed by harassment statutes are
permissible as a reasonable balance between legitimate speech interests and the state’s compelling interest in eradicating the harmful effects of harassment. The identity of those interests in the public
school context suggests that a similar balance is appropriate for cyberbullying. Therefore, just as free speech defenses to harassment
and stalking liability should fail, so too should the parallel defenses to
school discipline for cyberbullying.
1. Harassment Statutes
As Professor Susan Brenner has noted, harassment statutes are
among the few criminal statutes that target speech because of the effect it has on its target. 263 For example, some states criminalize sending a letter that conveys a threat, 264 and many states criminalize making obscene telephone calls; 265 but in all cases, a communication is
criminalized because of its harmful content. Under the Model Penal
Code, harassment occurs when, with the intent to harass another, one
(a) “makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication;” (b) “insults . . . or challenges another in a manner likely to
provoke violent or disorderly response;” or (c) “makes repeated
communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours.”266
Since the underlying event in any harassment case is a series of communications, we may wonder whether antiharassment laws violate the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that a
free speech challenge to a harassment statute would fail, but the

262. See, e.g., King, supra note 15, at 875 (noting that if schools do not take steps to address cyberbullying, they may face liability); see also Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at
53 (noting that criminal liability may be imposed against a cyberbully convicted of defaming another individual).
263. Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and
Data be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 328 (2003).
264. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3004 (West 2010) (criminalizing the sending of
a threatening letter); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(criminalizing a threat to terrorize others through violence); see also id. § 250.4(3) (criminalizing the harassment of others through crude language).
265. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100.3 (LexisNexis 2011) (criminalizing obscene
telephone calls with minors).
266. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4(1)–(3) (1985).
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Court has arguably implied it. 267 After all, anti-harassment statutes
criminalize the communication of low value speech if it “strays . . .
from the values of persuasion, dialogue and free exchange of ideas,
and moves toward willful threats to perform illegal acts, [where] the
state has greater latitude to regulate expression,” 268 and requires that
those communications be done in a manner likely to provoke a nega267. The same is true for a free speech challenge to Title VII, the most well known subset of harassment statutes that bans sexual harassment in the workplace. A number of
scholars have already concluded as much in the Title VII subcontext, pointing to the
Court’s silence on a possible First Amendment-Title VII conflict as evidence. Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content-Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bite,
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9–12 (arguing, in part, that the Court had the opportunity to address
the argument, fully briefed by the parties, that Title VII imposed an impermissible content-based restriction on free speech, but declined to do so). Professor Fallon and others
have argued that the Supreme Court has “strongly suggested” that a First Amendment
challenge to Title VII would fail. See id. (arguing that “it is highly unlikely that workplace
expressions of gender-based hostility and communications of explicitly sexual messages
will receive categorical [First Amendment] protection”); see also, e.g., Baty v. Willamette
Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1247 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We note that the Supreme Court has
strongly suggested that Title VII, in general, does not contravene the First Amendment.”).
First, the Court declined to address the free speech issues raised by a Title VII hostile environment claim in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), despite the opportunity to
do so. The defendant-employer briefed the First Amendment issues and the plaintiff answered. See Fallon, supra, at 9. Various amici also joined in the chorus. Id. at 9–10. The
Court’s silence on this issue, coupled with its duty to adopt a narrowing construction of
the statute “to avoid constitutional difficulties” if at all possible, suggests that the Justices
saw no need to narrow Title VII to avoid impingement on free-speech rights. Id. at 11.
Second, the Court’s opinion in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1993), implied that a
hostile-environment claim would survive a free-speech challenge. See id. at 389 (noting
that because words can violate laws directed against conduct, such words that are sexually
derogatory may violate Title VII). In that case, the Court struck down a municipal hatespeech ordinance that banned only those “fighting words” that expressed hate on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. Id. at 381. The problem was that the law banned
only one viewpoint: “aspersions upon a person’s mother, for example[,] would seemingly
be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc., tolerance
and equality, but could not be used by those speakers’ opponents.” Id. at 391. In other
words, as a law against intolerant speech, the statute was impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Id. Four Justices attacked this theory from all angles, including the warning that
“hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment should fail First Amendment review” based on the majority’s holding. Id. at 409–10 (White, J., concurring). Justice Scalia anticipatorily responded that Title VII can withstand scrutiny by noting that
“words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against
conduct,” and if “the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive
content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea.” Id. at 389–90 (majority opinion). As a result, so-called “fighting words” that are
sexually discriminatory could still produce a hostile workplace environment in violation of
Title VII. Lower courts have agreed with this analysis. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite
Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993) (“Title VII may legitimately proscribe
conduct, including undirected expressions of gender intolerance, which create an offensive working environment. That expression is ‘swept up’ in this proscription does not violate First Amendment principles.”).
268. In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Cal. 1995).
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tive response from the victim. 269 Most state harassment and stalking
statutes agree. Missouri’s stalking statute, for example, states that anyone “who purposely and repeatedly harasses . . . another person
commits the crime of stalking,” and defines “harasses” as engaging in
“a course of conduct directed at a specific person that serves no legitimate purpose, that would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and that actually causes substantial emotional distress to that person.” 270 Delaware’s harassment statute makes
it a crime to “harass . . . another person” by insulting, taunting, or
challenging them, or engaging “in any other course of alarming or
distressing conduct which serves no legitimate purpose and is in a
manner which the person knows is likely to . . . cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress.” 271 This interplay between communication of harmful speech and a reasonable production of actual harm or fear in the victim is precisely what has upheld
the constitutionality of other statutes, like anti-intimidation or antistalking rules, from free speech challenges. 272 As their close cousins,
harassment laws are likely similarly immune from First Amendment
challenges.
2. Bullying in Schools and Harassment
Harassment, then, differs from its non-actionable cousin of simply being mean to one another in the same ways that a school rife with
bullying and cyberbullying differs from one characterized by the
normal give-and-take of adolescence. There may be no precise boundary or bright line rule that identifies the hostile environments
created by harassment, but it is clear that the severe and pervasive abusive conduct that characterizes bullying and cyberbullying shares the
same five characteristics as behavior that falls under standard harassment statutes. First, both bullying and harassment require a pattern

269. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
270. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 1999). Michigan’s statute is almost identical. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411h(1)(b) (West 2004) (criminalizing stalking).
271. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007). Massachusetts’s statute treats harassment as a separate offense, and makes it a crime to inflict emotional distress upon a
victim. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 265, § 43A(a) (West 2008).
272. See Robert P. Faulkner & Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I’ll Follow: The Constitutionality of Antistalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19
(1994) (noting that expression of a “violent nature” which perpetuates fear in the victim is
not speech protected by the First Amendment).
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of repeated conduct. 273 Second, the kind of abusive behavior is similar. 274 Third, the victims of abuse are so-called weaker parties, identified, in part, by their real or perceived minority status in the school or
workplace environments. 275 Fourth, bullying and harassment have
the same effects on their victims. 276 Fifth, both forms of harassment
can be executed beyond the four walls of the shared environment. 277
These striking similarities, coupled with the clear differences between
this kind of harassing conduct and the behavior at issue in Tinker and
its progeny, suggest that bullying and cyberbullying in schools should
be treated more like harassment than student speech.
a. Repetition
Every court to address a criminal harassment claim has stated
that repetition of the conduct is determinative. 278 This makes sense
given the plain language of most states’ harassment and stalking statutes. Notably, this is also the case in the Title VII harassment context. 279 Similarly, bullying must be repeated. The repetition of hostile
273. See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 2–3 (describing cyberbulling as a pattern
of repeated behavior); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.225 (West 1999) (defining harassment
as involving a “course of conduct”).
274. For a discussion of cyberbullying behavior, see supra Part II. See also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007) (describing harassment as behavior consisting of insults,
taunts, or challenges made with the intent to “harass, annoy, or alarm another person”).
275. See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 3–4 (observing that bullying often involves a “power imbalance” whereby the bully has “some advantage” that can harm the victim); Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment Law
Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 135–36 (2008)
(noting that sexual harassment in the workplace arises from the power imbalance between
males and females).
276. For a discussion of some of the impacts of cyberbullying, see supra Part II. See also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1311(a)(1) (2007) (defining harassment as acting in such a
manner “which the person knows is likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response or
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress”).
277. See infra Part IV.B.2.e; see also Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual
Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 563 (2001) (noting that a significant amount of
the workplace harassment claims involve behavior taking place outside of the office).
278. See, e.g., Schwefel v. Kramschuster, No. 2010AP2924, 2011 WL 4550217, at ¶24
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2011) (“Harassment, as relevant here, is defined as ‘[e]ngaging in a
course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts which harass or intimidate another person and which serve no legitimate purpose.’” (quoting WIS. STAT. § 813.125(1)(b))).
279. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 648 (2007),
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101,
111, 113–15 (2002)) (noting that the nature of hostile environment claims “‘involves repeated conduct. The unlawful employment practice’ in hostile work environment claims,
‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps
years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.’ The persistence of the discriminatory conduct both indicates that man-
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acts is not only a defining element in the social science literature,280
but it distinguishes between the common give-and-take among adolescents and significantly more egregious conduct. Cyberattacking
does not share this characteristic.
b. Conduct
The kind of abusive behavior that constitutes harassment is also
similar to bullying behavior in schools. There may be no clear rule
that defines which conduct will amount to sufficiently severe harassment in either case, but a random survey of all harassment cases (including Title VII) evidences the striking identity of bad conduct. Using derogatory and degrading sexual terms to describe the victim, 281
repeatedly communicating in a manner likely to alarm,282 making
sexually explicit comments 283 and overtly sexual gestures, 284 spreading
sexual rumors, 285 attempting to physically abuse the victim, 286 drawing

agement should have known of its existence and produces a cognizable harm. . . . [T]he
very nature of the hostile work environment claim involves repeated conduct . . . .”) (internal citations omitted)), superseded on other grounds by statute.
280. Nansel defines “bullying” as “a specific type of aggression in which (1) the behavior
is intended to harm or disturb, (2) the behavior occurs repeatedly over time, and (3) there
is an imbalance of power, with a more powerful person or group attacking a less powerful
one.” Nansel, supra note 16, at 2094.
281. Compare, e.g., Spencer v. Gen. Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 218–19 (E.D. Va. 1988)
(discussing “derogatory and degrading comments” about the victim and the female gender), with Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the student
endured slurs about his sexuality).
282. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(4) (West 2011) (criminalizing harassment of others).
283. Compare, e.g., Grazioli v. Genuine Parts Co., 409 F. Supp. 2d 569, 573 (D.N.J. 2005)
(noting that on “‘Monday through Friday’ [the harasser] made ‘offensive, sexually related
comments and hand gestures[,]’ . . . used words such as ‘fuck’ and . . . referenced ‘blow
jobs’ ‘as part of his general conversation throughout the day’”), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at
451 (describing the use of sexually explicit terms and gestures about gay sex to torment
the victim), and Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955
(D. Kan. 2005) (noting that fellow students referred to the plaintiff as a “faggot,” screaming that “Dylan likes to suck cock,” and telling the school that “Dylan masturbates with
fish”).
284. Compare, e.g., Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 61 (2d
Cir. 1992) (noting that the aggressor “pretended to masturbate and ejaculate at victim behind her back to express his anger with her”), with Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 955 (describing how students performed mock fellatio as emblematic of the victim’s alleged sexual behavior).
285. Compare, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1994) (spreading rumors
that the victim was sexually involved with a superior), and Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 749 F. Supp.
946, 949 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (noting that a rumor spread about the victim and her colleague
having a sexual relationship), with Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 956 (describing how students
started a rumor that the victim was caught masturbating in the school bathroom).
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vulgar and explicit graffiti, 287 grabbing the victim in aggressive and
explicit ways, 288 making negative comments about the victim’s identity, 289 creating a rating system to assess the attractiveness of victims, 290
and a plethora of other behaviors characterize harassing environments.
c. Victims
In hostile workplace and educational environments, the victims
of harassment are the so-called “weaker” party, or perceived as such,
based on their minority status. Social scientists require a “power imbalance” between the aggressor and the victim for conduct to meet
the definition of bullying, 291 but just like women are not the only victims of harassment, the traditional image of a bully as a popular,
strong, athletic, and aggressive male who targets a physically weaker
student fails to capture the broad sweep of a power imbalance. A victim’s minority status can also cause a power imbalance; for example,
ethnicity may function as a status characteristic and can lead to an
imbalance of power, especially between members of ethnic minorities
on the one hand and ethnic majority group members on the other.292
Women have long been minorities in the workplace and in some in-

286. Compare, e.g., Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 926 (M.D. Ala.
1992) (describing a shouting match leading to assault), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 452 (describing physical abuse by a student).
287. Compare, e.g., Baty v. Willamette Indus., 985 F. Supp. 987, 992 (D. Kan. 1997) (discussing the existence of graffiti in the men’s bathroom specifically pertaining to the victim’s sexuality, exploits, and relationships), with Theno, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 955–56 (displaying depictions of the plaintiff or of gay sex).
288. Compare, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374 (8th Cir. 1996) (alleging that “at least twelve different male co-workers bagged [the victim] on some 100 occasions . . . ‘Bagging’ is . . . the intentional grabbing and squeezing of another person’s
testicles.”), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451 (describing the mock rape of the victim).
289. Compare, e.g., Stephenson v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 915 F. Supp. 39, 43–44 (S.D.
Ind. 1995) (demeaning and derogatory comments about women in the workplace as “sluts
and whores”), with Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 451–52 (commenting derogatorily about gays).
290. Compare, e.g., Wall v. A.T. & T. Tech., Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (M.D.N.C.
1990) (using a one-to-ten rating system to assess the physical attributes of women), with
Blumenfeld & Cooper, supra note 18, at 119 (including online polling pages to rate victims
as “hottest” or “ugliest” as examples of cyberaggressive behavior).
291. Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 257, at 4; Ericson, supra note 18.
292. Elizabeth G. Cohen et al., Treating Status Problems in the Cooperative Classroom, in
COOPERATIVE LEARNING: THEORY & RESEARCH 203–05 (Shlomo Sharan ed., 1990) (describing race and ethnicity as status characteristics that impact the “prestige and power order” of small groups working together). See also Waldman, supra note 201.
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dustries more than others. 293 And, like women—who make up the vast
majority of targets of sexual abuse in the workplace 294—ethnic, racial,
and sexual identity minorities are often the most severely bullied students in school. 295 Though these minorities can be victimized by single-incident aggression, so too is almost everyone else in school. Conversely, minorities are over-represented among victims of bullying and
harassment.
d. Effects
Given the similarities in conduct and types of victims, it should
come as no surprise that bullying and harassment harm their victims
in similarly devastating ways. Harassment and school bullying have
been found to cause stress, anxiety, mood swings, and depression.
They create feelings of embarrassment, shame, and low self-esteem. 296
293. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491 (M.D. Fla. 991)
(noting that the target, Lois Robinson, was a welder, and thus a minority in the welding
industry).
294. Women, however, are not the only victims. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76–77 (1998) (noting that Oncale was a male subject to sexual harassment in the workplace). For a good summary of some notable male-victim cases and
their legal strategies, see Stephen J. Nathans, Comment, Twelve Years After Price Waterhouse
and Still No Success for “Hopkins in Drag”: The Lack of Protection for the Male Victim of Gender
Stereotyping Under Title VII, 46 VILL. L. REV. 713, 724–39 (2001).
295. The GLSEN Survey revealed that 88.9 percent of students heard the word “gay”
used in a negative way, 72.4 percent heard other homophobic remarks (that is, “dyke” or
“faggot”) in school and online, and 84.6 percent were verbally harassed (that is, called
names or threatened with violence) at school because of their sexual orientation. GLSEN
Survey, supra note 51, at xvi. More than 40 percent were physically harassed (that is,
pushed, shoved, or otherwise physically attacked) at school in the past year because of
their sexual orientation, and 27.2 percent were harassed based on their gender expression.
Id. Nearly 20 percent were physically assaulted (that is punched, kicked, or attacked with a
weapon), and nearly 53 percent were harassed or threatened via electronic media (that is,
text messages, emails, instant messages, or postings on Facebook). Id. As a result, more
than 61 percent felt unsafe at school because of their sexual orientation and 39.9 percent
felt unsafe at school because of how they expressed their gender. Id.
296. Id. In particular, Professor Harvey Hornstein has showed correlations between “a
boss’s abusive disrespect” and depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem. HARVEY A.
HORNSTEIN, BRUTAL BOSSES AND THEIR PREY 74–75 (1996). See Jane E. Brody, Researchers
Unravel the Motives of Stalkers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/
08/25/science/researchers-unravel-the-motives-of-stalkers.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
(noting that “the repeated harassment commonly results in acute emotional distress and
can seriously disrupt the way victims live”). These psychological effects have been linked
to serious physical effects, like cardiovascular disease and musculoskeletal disorders. See
NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, STRESS AT WORK 11 (1999),
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/99-101/pdfs/99-101.pdf (noting that psychologically
demanding positions can cause cardiovascular and musculoskeletal disorders, among others). See generally Ybarra, supra note 36 (discussing the psychological effects of cyberbullying, including depression); Nishina & Juvonen, supra note 36 (discussing the psychological
and social effects of harassment on youth); Michele L. Ybarra, Linkages Between Depressive
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More severe effects can include PTSD, 297 and even severe physical effects like compromised immunity to infection, headaches, spikes in
blood pressure, and digestive problems related to stress. 298 The Supreme Court recognized these damaging effects in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., noting that a “discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep
them from advancing in their careers.” 299 And various courts and
scholars have chronicled similar effects in bullying victims. Singleincident cyberattacking does not share this characteristic.
e. Location
Harassment targets its victims anywhere and everywhere. We
have already seen how bullies can harass their victims even when not
on school property 300 and how the multi-location reach of state criminal harassment statutes is clear from their plain language. Harassment can involve phone calls, 301 sexually explicit and lewd emails, 302
looking at pornography online, knowing it will be seen or heard by
others, 303 harassing text messages, and vulgar and sexually explicit Facebook posts, and “email bombing.” 304 Just like our modern lives are

Symptomatology and Internet Harassment Among Regular Internet Users, 7 CYBERPSCHOLOGY
BEHAV. 247 (2004) (describing the link between depression and cyberbullying).
297. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the victim was diagnosed with PTSD as a result of the trauma exhibited from bullying).
298. David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of ‘Workplace Bullying’ and the Need for Status-Blind
Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 483 (2000). See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS 21–23 (2001) (describing victim experiences of stalking); see also WILLARD, supra note 37, at 27–56 (discussing how bullying affects victims in many different ways).
299. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
300. See supra Part II.A.
301. See, e.g., Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice Inst’l Div., 512 F.3d 157, 164
(5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that ten to fifteen nightly phone calls for nearly four months
from the plaintiff's supervisor amounted to pervasive harassment).
302. E.g., Lee v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, No. 07-677, 2007 WL 2463404, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
28, 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss a Title VII gender discrimination claim where supporting allegations in the complaint showed that the plaintiff had received pornographic
emails).
303. E.g., E.E.O.C. v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 2009) (discussing an employee who watched pornography at his desk and cursed loudly to retaliate
against a co-worker, who sat adjacent to his desk).
304. Email “bombing” is a form of net abuse where an attacker sends huge volumes of
email to an address in an attempt to overflow the mailbox or a server host. This usually
causes the victim’s service to be shut off. As Professor Citron has detailed, email “bomb-
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digital, 305 the modern school is wired with Internet access and integrates technology into the curriculum. Many employers allow “telework” or “remote work,” permitting their employees to work from
home and providing the hardware and software to do it. 306 Increasingly, we communicate with one another over Skype, 307 and participate in chat rooms. Many of us maintain Facebook or online dating
profiles. 308 According to one recent study, 81 percent of adults age
thirty to forty-nine and 70 percent of adults age fifty to sixty-four have
an online presence. 309 This places them squarely in the same virtual
role occupied by students, making them similarly subject to cyberharassment and cyberaggressive behavior.
3. Implications of Similarities: Cyberbullying and the First
Amendment
Like Amelia, the cyberaggressor challenging her punishment on
First Amendment grounds, Zachary the cyberbully is likely to offer the
same campus presence and pure speech arguments. 310 In the alternative, he is likely to argue that his conduct could have no effect on the
school because his behavior was directed at one individual, not the
school. These arguments miss the point. Harassment of one can
create hostility for all, but even if there was a per se rule that intimidation of one student could never cause a sufficient effect on a school, a
school’s decision to discipline Zachary should not be judged through
the student speech context. Zachary was not simply acting qua student when he abused his victims over a period of time; he was acting
much like a harasser. His argument that he should not be subject to
ing” is a common tool used by men to silence women’s voices online. See Citron, supra
note 15.
305. See Ari Waldman, Aristotle’s Internet: Classical Values in Our Digital Lives (unpublished
manuscript).
306. See OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, STATUS OF TELEWORK IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2011), http://www.telework.gov/Reports
_and_Studies/Annual_Reports/2010teleworkreport.pdf (describing the increased incidence of teleworking).
307. See How to Ace a Job Interview on Skype, TIME, http://www.time.com/
time/video/player/0,32068,46937715001_1933401,00.html (illustrating how companies,
in efforts to save costs, increasingly use Skype or online video chat to conduct interviews).
308. Forty-seven percent of online adults maintain a profile on a social networking site.
While that is significantly lower than teenagers (ages twelve to seventeen) and young
adults (ages eighteen to twenty-nine), the number has grown exponentially in the last five
years. Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media & Mobile Internet Use Among Teens and Young
Adults, PEWINTERNET.ORG, at 17 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files
/Reports/2010/PIP_Social_Media_and_Young_Adults_Report_Final_with_toplines.pdf.
309. Id. at 5.
310. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.

2012]

HOSTILE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

761

school discipline for conduct that took place off campus will fail not
because the Court’s effects test never required a campus presence,
but because liability under traditional harassment law is not limited to
face-to-face conduct. Similarly, Zachary’s potential First Amendment
defense to discipline should fail not because his conduct affected the
school, but because, similar to harassment laws, any incidental impingements on free speech are permissible given that students are
“captive audiences” for the purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence and given the state’s compelling interest to prevent harassment
in schools and ensure educational opportunities for all.
Context pervades First Amendment jurisprudence; it is essential
for determining when restrictions on speech are permissible. 311 And,
given the similarities between traditional harassment and bullying in
schools, free speech defenses to harassment liability and school disciplinary authority should fail, as a matter of First Amendment doctrine,
for the same three reasons. First, the state’s interest in restricting,
eradicating, and punishing hostile, harassing, or abusive speech may
clash with fundamental free speech principles, but any such clash,
even with significant impingements on harasser speech rights, would
survive strict scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, a restriction on expression must be supported by a “compelling” government interest, it
must be necessary to accomplish that interest, and it must be narrowly
tailored so it exerts the least possible burden on free speech rights. 312
Even laws that are content- or viewpoint-based are permissible if they
pass strict scrutiny. 313

311. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 736, 747–48 (1978) (“Because content of that
character is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances, we
must consider its context in order to determine whether the Commission’s action was constitutionally permissible.”).
312. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(holding that an agreement between a union representative and a school board, giving
that representative exclusive access to the teachers’ mailboxes and thereby excluding a
rival union, was unconstitutional because restricting the speech of the rival union was not
narrowly tailored to a compelling interest of the school board); see also Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535–36 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (ruling that a prohibition on gender discrimination in the workplace constitutes “compelling” state interest
within the meaning of First Amendment strict scrutiny).
313. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (ruling that intentional financial discrimination designed to suppress
certain ideas is not per se suspect); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
814 (2000) (noting that where a statute regulates speech based on its content, it is subject
to strict scrutiny); John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 878 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring
narrow tailoring aimed at a compelling government interest).
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The state has a compelling interest in eradicating harassment
and its resulting discrimination. 314 And the specific focus of harassment and stalking statutes—reaching significant harm while leaving
untouched the kind of ordinary give-and-take among people—means
that the statutes are both necessary and sufficiently narrowly tailored
to survive any strict scrutiny analysis on a claim that they violate fundamental free speech rights. 315 The similarities between harassment
and bullying, together with the salient and unique roles schools play
in educating the nation’s youth for participation in civil society, suggests that there is a compelling interest in eradicating hostile educational environments, as well. Presumably, the school has a mandate
to teach anti-harassing behavior; after all, a school would not be adequately preparing students for the workforce if it was training
workplace harassers. Subjecting bullies and cyberbullies to school
discipline is also a sufficiently narrowly tailored tactic given the egregiousness and rarity of true bullying cases.
The unique context of the school creates a compelling interest in
eradicating from our schools the kind of harassment caused by identity-based bullying and cyberbullying even when it is not based on sex.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the role of public
education is to do more than teach reading, writing, and arithmetic.
It “must prepare pupils for citizenship” and “inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and
as indispensible to the practice of self-government . . . .” 316 Schools
“inculcat[e] fundamental values” 317 not only through books, but by
example, teaching “lessons of civil, mature conduct” both in and out
of the classroom. 318 The lesson that we should not harass, abuse, or
mistreat those who are different, weak, or easy targets is undoubtedly
part of the “civil, mature conduct” that is both essential to growing up
and essential to a functioning democracy. Furthermore, just like the
Court acknowledged that schools have an “important—indeed, per314. See, e.g., Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (affirming that the state has a
“compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens”); Bd. of Dir.
of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987) (same). See also Deborah
Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace: Running the Gauntlet of
Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 436–42 (1996) (providing an indepth and comprehensive constitutional and policy argument in favor of the government’s
compelling interest in eradicating sex discrimination in the workplace).
315. See Epstein, supra note 314, at 442–46 (developing more fully the necessity and narrow tailoring arguments).
316. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES A.
BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
317. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979).
318. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
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haps compelling” interest in deterring illegal behavior, such as drug
use, 319 and buttressed that strong interest with evidence about the extensive school drug problem, there is ample evidence that growing
incivility among our youth and adult population is causing personal
and systemic harm. Identity-based bullying and cyberbullying is getting worse, 320 and has contributed to the deaths of no less than ten
young men and women in the last two years alone. 321 It has particularly devastating effects on minority populations and those so-called
“hidden populations” that are victimized not only by aggressors at
school, but by a greater community that hates them. 322 And outside
the school context, our public discourse is so deeply infected with incivility, ad hominem attacks, and expressions of hate that it took the
shooting of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords to even get us talking
about how we treat one another. 323 Politicians are adults; they can
319. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995)).
320. A comparison of two Youth Internet Safety Surveys conducted in 2000 and 2006
suggests that cyberbullying is becoming more common. In 2006, 9 percent of survey participants reported being harassed online with almost 33 percent surveyed admitting to activities that fit the cyberbullying definition. Those numbers are up from 6 percent and 12
percent, respectively, from the 2000 study. JANIS WOLAK ET AL., ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF
YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 10–11 (2006), http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf.
321. See, e.g., Meghan Barr, 1 Ohio School, 4 Bullied Teens Dead at Own Hand, MSNBC
(Oct. 8, 2010, 2:56 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39578548/ns/healthkids_and_parenting/ (noting three teen suicides and one overdose over the past two years
as a result of school tormenting); Lisa Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal
Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at A1 (describing the suicide of a male college student
following his roommate’s online posting of a webcam video); Andrew Knittle, North Grad
Took Own Life After Week of ‘Toxic’ Comments, NORMAN TRANSCRIPT, Oct. 10, 2010,
http://normantranscript.com/headlines/x1477594493/-I-m-sure-he-took-it-personally
(describing a teen suicide following attendance at a series of anti-homosexual town meetings); Kevin Cullen, Standing Up for Phoebe, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2010,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/03/30/standing_up_fo
r_phoebe/ (describing a prosecutor’s decision to press charges against a teen’s tormenters
following the teen’s suicide).
322. See Douglas D. Heckathorn, Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid Population
Estimates from Chain-Referral Samples of Hidden Populations, 49 SOC. PROBS. 11, 11–13 (2002)
(discussing methods of sampling hidden populations, including homosexuals). Gays and
lesbians are only one type of hidden population. Another is someone who cannot come
forward and identify himself for fear of legal reprisal, like an intravenous drug user. Id. at
11. As such, it is difficult for social scientists to reach this population for study. Id. Professor Heckathorn has pioneered the use of online social networks to reach this type of population.
323. See, e.g., Helene Cooper & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Calls for a New Era of Civility in U.S.
Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A1. Some have argued that increasingly aggressive
bullies and cyberbullies are taking their cues from an increasingly aggressive political and
social discourse. See, e.g., Judith Barr, Bullying in the Policial Arena: What are we Teaching Our
Children?, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
judith-barr/political-bullying_b_982079.html (listing examples of bullying in politics and
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handle themselves. Children cannot. And, if the Court is serious
about “civil, mature conduct” being essential to both schooling and
democracy, 324 then schools have a mandate to punish behavior that is
incongruous with those principles.
Second, harassing or abusive speech that creates hostile working
or educational environments falls within the “captive audience” exception to the First Amendment. The First Amendment permits restrictions on certain kinds of offensive speech when the target of the
speech has no recourse to avoid it. 325 The exception appears to be
based on the privacy interests of the listeners, inasmuch as their privacy is being invaded by aggressive, intolerable speech, 326 and requires
that they have no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech. 327
After all, “The right to express ideas does not include the right to impose the communication of those ideas upon an unwilling listener. . . . Citizens have a right to speak. Citizens also have a right not to
be forced to listen.” 328 Because of the unique characteristics of a
workplace and a school, workers and students should be considered
captive audiences.
The case law involving captive audiences suggests the doctrine is
a misnomer. Permissible regulation of speech does not hinge on the
relative “captivity” of the audience wherever they may be, as the docquestioning the impact such examples have on children). And, still, our political discourse
is uncivil. After testifying at a House of Representatives committee hearing, Georgetown
law student Sandra Fluke was called a “slut” and a “prostitute” by conservative talk radio
host Rush Limbaugh. These disgusting comments prompted a tepid response from the
Republican Party’s leading candidate for its presidential nomination, Mitt Romney: “It’s
not the language I would have used.” Alex Seitz-Wald, Romney Declines To Criticize Limbaugh
— Again, THINK PROGRESS, Mar. 7, 2012, at http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2012/
03/07/439483/romney-limbaugh-fail/?mobile=nc.
324. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (finding that
schools have an obligation to promote civil and mature conduct).
325. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,
541–42 (1980) (the government cannot prohibit “speech as intrusive unless the ‘captive’
audience cannot avoid objectionable speech,” and therefore ruling that a utility company
may include “controversial matters of public policy” within the same envelope as a billing
statement because a customer can easily “avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities
by averting their eyes”).
326. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ( “[T]the ability of government . . .
to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that susbstantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”).
327. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21–22). In
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), Justice Douglas, a usual ally of Justice
Black’s First Amendment absolutism, stated that there is “no right to force [a] message
upon [those] incapable of declining to receive it.” Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
328. Von Lusch v. C & P Tel. Co., 457 F. Supp. 814, 819 (D. Md. 1978) (quoting Von
Lusch v. State, 39 Md. App. 517, 525, 387 A.2d 306, 310 (1978)).
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trine’s name might suggest, but on the unique relationship between
the audience and the place holding that audience “captive.” 329 This
explains why the Court has used the doctrine to uphold restrictions
on television broadcasts, 330 mail, 331 and harassing phone calls 332 in the
home, even though it is easy to change the channel, throw out unwanted mail, or hang up the telephone, but has declined to extend
the doctrine to restrictions on offensive speech in places like a school
board meeting, 333 from which it possible to escape, but only if you are
willing to give up your right to be heard. Even though residents in
their home can avoid what they feel is offensive or abusive speech by
ignoring or discarding it, the fact that the speech invades the home—
where we are lords of our own manors—is paramount. This near exclusive application of the “captive audience” doctrine to the home has
moved some scholars, most notably Eugene Volokh, 334 to argue that
this exception does not adequately justify Title VII’s restrictions on coworker speech. 335
Professor Volokh believes that this precedent means that the
home may be the only locus of a captive audience, 336 but in so concluding, he misses the Court’s multi-layered reasoning. What permits
a captive audience exception in the home is not the home itself, but
rather our refusal to accept that evidently easy avoidance should be
necessary in the home. We are not held “captive” in the home any
more than we are captive on the street because we can simply turn off
a television, walk into another room, or step outside. But because of

329. See Lehman, 418 U.S. at 307 (arguing that a municipality cannot post advertisements on the inside of city buses, not because of the posters’ content but because buses
are a practical necessity for individuals in urban areas and thus they are a “captive audience”).
330. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978).
331. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
332. See, e.g., Gormley v. Dir., Conn. State Dep’t of Prob., 632 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir.
1980).
333. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
334. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1791, 1838–40 (1992) (arguing that the captive audience doctrine should not be extended
to the workplace).
335. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title VII’s Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 563, 565–67 (2001) (noting that the captive
audience exception “as currently structured does not fit harassment cases”); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual Harassment, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003, 1031 (1993) (“A workplace is not a home.”).
336. See Volokh, supra note 334, at 1834–35 (rationalizing that only the physical boundaries of the home could reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision to protect speech in Rowan and Cohen, two cases in which the listeners were arguably more captive than a listener
in a home who could simply throw a pamphlet in the trash or turn off the radio).
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the unique role of the home in the privacy rights of the resident, we
should not have to. The Court’s precedents limiting the captive audience exception to the home are based on “[t]he ancient concept
that ‘a man’s home is his castle’ into which ‘not even the king may enter . . . .’” 337 It is not the edifice that gives meaning to this well-worn
saying; it is our expectation of privacy within the home that does.
This explains why Paul Cohen could wear his “Fuck the Draft” jacket
in a courthouse despite the argument that he “thrust” his “distasteful
mode of expression . . . upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers.” 338
Courthouse visitors have no right to a captive audience exception because we do not associate important privacy rights with visitors to
courthouses. 339 The captive audience doctrine is particularly strong
in the home, then, because of one’s privacy rights within the home. It
is the imbalance of rights—the offensive speaker’s relatively weak
right to speak compared to the resident’s robust privacy rights within
his home—that gives the captive audience exception in the home any
meaning. It stands to reason, then, that equally as important rights in
other contexts could outweigh an offensive speaker’s right to speak.
Granted, while my theory that the captive audience exception is
applicable to those contexts that implicate important, perhaps fundamental, privacy rights takes the exception out of the limited boundaries of the home, it does not necessarily extend it to the workplace
or the school, for example. Workers certainly have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their office, 340 but it is exceedingly unlikely to
be as strong as a person’s expectation of privacy in his home. 341 That
concern is of no moment. Fundamental privacy rights happen to be
the counterweight that makes it inappropriate to expect a resident to
walk outside of his home to avoid offensive speech, but there is no
principle that makes privacy the only possible counterweight. Admittedly, it may be an extension of the Court’s precedents to recognize a
captive audience exception based on fundamental rights other than
337. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
338. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of the government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded
in an essentially intolerable manner.”).
339. Id. at 21–22.
340. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (plurality opinion) (a search of
an employee’s office is “justified at its inception” if the there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that evidence of work-related misconduct will be uncovered).
341. See id. at 716 (“As with the expectation of privacy in one’s home, such an expectation in one’s place of work is ‘based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the
history of the Amendment.’” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8
(1984))).
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privacy in the home, but such an extension makes sense. There are
other fundamental rights that are just as important as being the king
of one’s castle.
Equal protection is a paradigmatic example. As Deborah Epstein
has noted, Congress expressly enacted Title VII based on the Commerce Clause and on the “Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 authority ‘to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the [Fourteenth Amendment],’” 342 of which the Equal Protection Clause is one
essential part. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court
recognized this dual source of authority, 343 and while the majority
found no need to address the Fourteenth Amendment issue, Justices
Douglas and Goldberg wrote separately to make clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of enforcement authority would have
been a legitimate independent basis for Title VII. 344 The law was
meant to be a “vindication of human dignity,” 345 a fundamental right
that is assaulted by hostile environment harassment and bullying and
cyberbullying in schools. We should not expect harassed co-workers
and abused students to have to look the other way, transfer, or quit in
order to avoid their tormenter. They have a fundamental right to the
same opportunities as those around them.
Indeed, those escape options may not even be possible. Most
employees cannot simply leave work to avoid harassment, lest they be
fired. They can ask for transfers, but that is neither a feasible option
in small companies nor an effective option in large companies. Furthermore, while transfers to another office, building, or city may allow
the victim to avoid her harasser, not only is moving to another city often infeasible, but the notion that harassment victims should be “run
out of town” before the harasser has his right to abusive speech curtailed is laughable. And if the victim stays and remains subject to her
harassment, her job performance, psychological well-being, and
health will suffer. Any suggestion that employees can simply avoid
their harassers or ignore them is to misconstrue the workplace: to say
that harassment victims in the workplace are not “captives” in the literal sense is to actually say that harassment victims who can afford not to
work are not captives. Therefore, female employees constitute the

342. Epstein, supra note 314, at 437 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
343. 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964) (“The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress
based the Act on § 5 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as
well as its power to regulate interstate commerce under Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, of the Constitution.”).
344. Id. at 283–86 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291–93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
345. Id. at 291 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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quintessential captive audience. We “should not force a woman into a
Hobson’s choice between quitting her job” and denying herself her
right to equal protection, “or facing a work environment in which she
is subjected to severe or pervasive harassing speech that is not inflicted on her male counterparts.” 346
Student victims of school bullying and cyberbullying confront a
worse situation. Bullying and cyberbullying victims have the same
right, under the Equal Protection Clause, 347 to the same educational
opportunities as everyone else. That is, after all, what Title IX is about
in the gender discrimination context. 348 But one student’s right to
the same educational opportunities as others is no less real even outside the Title IX umbrella. Yet his exercise of that right is diminished
when repeated harassment from a peer interferes with his academic
success, mental and physical health, and self-esteem. It would be absurd to expect parents to deny their children their fundamental rights
by taking them out of school or spending significant time and money
placing them in new schools before a bully’s First Amendment rights
are curtailed. And the prospect of avoiding a harasser is even more
dismal for students than for employees. In the workplace, quitting is
technically an option, albeit one rife with difficulties and virtually impossible for those without other means of financial support. Students
cannot simply quit school, 349 and transferring is difficult, especially in
small towns. Recent bullying cases have resulted in their victims transferring to entirely different school districts, 350 but that option is unavailable to those without the financial means to relocate or to those
without an extended family willing to take them in. Schools can
change their students’ class schedules so that bullies and victims are
never in class together, but these half-hearted solutions rarely work;
everyone sees everyone in the hall, in the cafeteria, or after school.
And neither of these options can protect a victim from cyberbullying,
where harassment can reach its victims wherever they are located.

346. Epstein, supra note 314, at 425.
347. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
348. See, e.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 968
(D. Kan. 2005) (“Damages are available only where the behavior is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive that it denies its victims the equal access to education that Title
IX is designed to protect.” (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
652 (1999))).
349. Students can be home-schooled, but few parents have the resources or ability to
exercise this option.
350. See, e.g., Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that Jamie
transferred twice to escape his harassers).
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In addition to the strict scrutiny and captive audience arguments,
there is a third reason why the First Amendment should not limit harassment liability and a school’s authority to discipline bullies and cyberbullies. Harassing speech, by its very nature, deserves minimal
First Amendment protection. Harassing speech targets one victim,
and targeted speech has traditionally been afforded fewer constitutional protections than speech aimed at larger audiences. 351 The latter is more likely to have political value and the former is more likely
to be harmful. 352 Bullying and cyberbullying is similarly targeted toward one person and likely has limited political value. Undoubtedly,
abusive speech has almost no political value compared to the armband protest in Tinker, which further explains why Tinker is an inappropriate lens through which to evaluate bullying and cyberbullying.
V. CONCLUSION: FINDING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE
I have argued that cyberattacking and cyberbullying should be
treated differently, with respect to potential First Amendment defenses to a school’s disciplinary authority, because as single-incident
actors, some cyberattackers are sometimes simply too common and
generally act like immature students, whereas cyberbullies, as repeated harassers, are relatively rare and mimic workplace harassers in
striking ways. 353 Identity-based aggressors, however, should be treated
the same. Within that argument, I propose a number of theories: that
the Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence used the oncampus/off-campus distinction as a proxy for when students are acting qua students; 354 that modern technology has dramatically changed
the nature of the school and office such that presence in one location
is meaningless; 355 that neither the Court’s student speech cases nor
any harassment cases have ever, and should ever, be restricted to conduct that occurs within the boundaries of the school or office or
home; 356 that, taken together, the Court’s student speech cases reflect
a consistent effects test as the basis for justifying school discipline of
student speakers; and that a “captive audience” doctrine that is nei-

351. See Fallon, supra note 267, at 42.
352. See, e.g., Kent Greewalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L.
REV. 287, 292–93 (1990) (arguing that when a speaker verbally attacks a listener, the intention is to inflict emotional pain on the listener; by contrast, in the absence of the same listener, the speaker would simply be expressing his opinion).
353. See supra Part IV.
354. See supra Part III.
355. See supra Part III.4.
356. See supra Part IV.B.2.e.
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ther about the ability to escape nor the location of captivity, but rather the clash between competing fundamental rights, protects both
harassment statutes and a school’s disciplinary authority from First
Amendment attack. 357
The practical implication of this argument is that some cyberattackers will not be punished, but all identity-based aggressors and all
cyberbullies will. Free speech principles will protect some cyberattackers if their single attacks do not touch the school’s ability to successfully teach its students, but not those who use the sword of Internet aggression to attack their victim’s identity and community. But
the First Amendment will not protect cyberbullies because of their
striking similarities with harassers, a group not afforded significant
free speech rights. 358 Admittedly, this leaves some bad conduct outside the reach of punishment, as well it should. It forces those schools
that want to regulate single-incident cyberattacking to do so without
the iron fist of expulsions, suspensions, detentions, and other forms
of punishment. This may be the most beneficial result, as studies
show that more than any other factor, creating a school climate where
bullying is rejected as a social evil and where bullying victims can find
support among their peers and teachers and in an inclusive curriculum will reduce the frequency and effects of bullying in schools. 359
Increasingly harsh punishments will not. My proposal’s narrow focus
recognizes that ultimately, punishing all bad students will not solve
the problem of harassment and cyberharassment in schools. Discipline should be left to capture the outliers, the egregious cases that defy the reach of a school’s “soft power.” After all, bullying and cyberbullying are social, not legal, problems. To the extent that legal issues
are implicated, the lawyer’s role is to provide the boundaries of rulemaking, leaving the social scientist, educator, and counselor the latitude to use the most effective tools.
My theory also protects the vast majority of students. Many of us
have engaged in immature and mean conduct, but our behavior bears
little similarity to attacks on identity or the constant, pervasive harassment that have caused too many victimized students to commit
357. See supra Part IV.B.3.
358. See supra Part IV.B.2.
359. See Paul D. Flaspohler et al., Stand by Me: The Effects of Peer and Teacher Support in Mitigating the Impact of Bullying on Quality of Life, 46 PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SCHOOLS 636, 638,
646 (2009), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pits.v46:7/issuetoc (concluding
that those students who experienced high levels of teacher and peer social support indicated fewer problems with bullying and a higher quality of life in school); Julia S. Chibbaro, School Counselors and the Cyberbully: Interventions and Implications, 11 ASCA 65, 66–67
(Oct. 2007).
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suicide. At the same time, by permitting school discipline for bullies
and cyberbullies and identity-based aggressors, my theory protects the
hardest hit victims from the argument that “boys will be boys” or that
“this is all part of growing up.” 360
The long-term health of the First Amendment is another beneficiary of my approach. We want to give schools the power to punish
the most serious peer abusers and harassers, but we do not want to
chill speech or apply the school’s iron fist to the common, everyday
give-and-take among adolescents. In other words, my proposal protects the First Amendment from attacks from all angles. By clarifying
the Court’s student speech jurisprudence as the lens through which
we judge First Amendment defenses to a school’s punishment of a cyberaggressor, my proposal protects student free expression from the
Court’s rightward drift when it comes to student speech. To undermine the original Tinker vision in the name of disciplining singleincident cyberattacking is to show little respect for students and their
speech rights and to elevate an almost Orwellian view of the public
school to the point where students have few, if any, rights to call their
own.

360. See, e.g., Andy Birkey, Family Council Claims Success in Stopping Anti-Bullying Efforts in
Anoka-Hennepin, MINN. INDEP. (Dec. 29, 2010, 11:20 AM), http://minnesotaindependent.
com/75517/family-council-claims-success-in-stopping-anti-bullying-efforts-in-anoka-hennepin (discussing the anti-gay Minnesota’s Family Council’s campaign to prevent antibullying programs because it would cause “child corruption”). See also Casey, supra note 59
(discussing conservative opposition to addressing the problem of bullying in schools).

